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ABSTRACT
Medium access control (MAC) protocol security is important in wireless networks
due to the lack of physical access control that normally exists in wired networks
in the form of connecting a cable. Most efforts in standards organizations and
academic research focus on the requirements of confidentiality and authentication.
These approaches to wireless MAC-layer security often ignore two other threats
to security: attacks against availability and incorrect implementation of MAC
protocol and driver routines. The former can prevent a user from communicating
at all, whereas the latter can have consequences ranging from dropped packets to
complete host compromise.
This dissertation comprehensively investigates the threats against wireless MAC
protocols: being uncooperative, denial-of-service (DoS), sniffing, man-in-the-middle
(MITM), and fuzzing. I provide a mathematical model to understand how net-
work parameters impact the uncooperative carrier-sense-misbehaving attackers.
Next, this dissertation shows a novel DoS attack that targets queuing behavior
of access points by exploiting some factors of the IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol.
Further, I propose a scheme that establishes a wireless connection that is secure
against sniffing and MITM between a client device and an access point in IEEE
802.11 hotspots. Finally, I propose MAC-layer threats including fuzzing in IEEE
802.16e mobile WiMAX networks.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
A wireless network consists of two major components: base stations (or access
points) and mobile stations (or clients). A mobile station associates with a base
station and routes all traffic through it. This association is analogous to plugging
a cable into a switch or hub in wired networks. In wired networks, due to physical
restriction to user’s ability to plugging, most threats such as denial-of-service
(DoS) attack target layer 3 (network) or above. However, security in a wireless
network is more complicated than in a wired network, due to the open nature of
wireless networks. In particular, many attacks target the medium access control
(MAC) protocol.
Wireless networks based on IEEE 802.16e mobile WiMAX [1], IEEE 802.11 Wi-
Fi [2], etc. are widely deployed for governmental, commercial, and personal uses.
As the demand for wireless communication increases, securing wireless systems
against malicious behavior has also taken on increasing importance. Major efforts
in standards organizations and academic research on MAC protocol security focus
on the requirements of confidentiality and integrity. While a cryptographic attack
has strong adverse effects on a user’s privacy through compromise of a protocol’s
confidentiality and integrity, an attacker may also seek to deny services to other
users; that is, the threat aims to reduce a protocol’s availability. Hence, I elect
to investigate the threats against the MAC protocol: being uncooperative, DoS,
sniffing, man-in-the-middle (MITM), and fuzzing.
Many modern wireless systems including IEEE 802.11 use carrier sense multiple
access (CSMA) as MAC protocols. In CSMA, a station performs carrier sense in
a shared wireless medium to decide whether to transmit a packet or wait. I con-
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sider the case where an attacker is uncooperative and does not obey a configured
carrier sense threshold. I develop a mathematical model to understand how net-
work parameters impact the uncooperative carrier-sense-misbehaving attackers. I
present the model and discuss how to prevent this uncooperative misbehaving in
Chapter 2.
I investigate another aspect of the IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol that might be
susceptible to uncooperative behavior. I develop the partial deafness attack, a
novel DoS attack. My attack is based on the realization that many commercial
access points are implemented with only a single data queue, because the 802.11
standard does not specify or recommend any queuing behavior. I detail my DoS
attack and discuss its countermeasure in Chapter 3. This work is published in [3].
In the case of IEEE 802.11, Wi-Fi protected access (WPA) [4] provides solutions
to home, small business, and enterprise networks, but hotspots typically are not
secured at the MAC protocol from the threats of sniffing and MITM because
they are open to the public. In Chapter 4, I develop a scheme that establishes
a secure wireless connection between a client device and an access point in these
open environments. This work is published in [5].
Recently, a technique called fuzzing developed to automate the detection of
unusual behavior. In particular, in fuzzing, a system evaluator sends a variety of
invalid inputs to the system under test, and observes the behavior of the system.
Though fuzzing was initially aimed at user-mode programs, it has since been ex-
tended to protocol implementations. Moreover, even though fuzzing is a technique
used to test application input handling, attackers can also submit nonstandard
inputs to an application in hopes of achieve malicious results. In Chapter 5, I
evaluate several WiMAX implementations using fuzzing based on the WiMAX
MAC protocol conformance tester and other tools as appropriate.
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CHAPTER 2
REVISITING CARRIER SENSE
MISBEHAVIOR IN 802.11 NETWORKS
Many modern wireless systems including IEEE 802.11 use carrier sense multiple
access (CSMA) in their Media Access Control (MAC) protocols. In CSMA, a
station senses a carrier in a shared wireless medium to decide whether to transmit
a packet. Even though there are different carrier sense mechanisms, such as energy
detection or spreading code correlation, such mechanisms typically determine the
status of a medium by comparing a measured value (e.g. average energy or peak
value of correlation) to a threshold. If the measured value is above the threshold,
the medium is considered busy. Since the carrier sense threshold significantly
affects the network performance, the design of an optimal carrier sense threshold
in wireless networks has been an important research problem [6–8]. These works
attempted to find an optimal carrier sense threshold assuming that every station
in a network is configured with the same threshold.
In parallel to this direction of research, another direction of research has consid-
ered the case where an attacker does not obey a configured carrier sense thresh-
old [9–11]. Prior work in this direction analyzes the impact of an attacker cheating
on its carrier sense threshold on a network. I refer to this attack as carrier sense
misbehavior and evaluate the impact of the misbehaving carrier sense threshold
using two metrics: how much the attacker obtains its own benefit (with selfish
purpose) and how much the attacker imposes performance degradation of other
stations on the network (with malicious purpose). Prior work generally focused
on the benefit to a selfish attacker, since high carrier sense threshold enables a
station to get more chances to transmit a packet than do legitimate stations due
to faster decrease of its backoff counter even in the presence of a packet transmis-
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sion. However, a high carrier sense threshold can negatively affect the attacker
since the attacker risks additional collisions from transmitting its packet during
another station’s transmission. Prior work did not well analyze this negative effect
on the attacker.
In this chapter, I analyze the effect of carrier sense misbehavior on the attacker
and the network in more detail. I develop an analytical model by extending
the original Bianchi Markov chain model [12] that analyzes the throughput per-
formance of 802.11 MAC protocol without any attackers. Using my model and
simulation, I study how different 802.11 network parameters (such as data rate,
MAC packet data unit (PDU) size, and slot time) affect the attacker’s perfor-
mance. I show that not all configurations of network parameters under study
benefit the attacker. My contributions are:
• I develop an analytical model that considers a carrier-sense-misbehaving
attacker to understand the attacker’s benefit.
• I implement carrier sense misbehavior in a network simulator, ns-2, and I
verify my model by comparing analytical results to simulation results.
• I quantify the attacker’s benefit under diverse network environments through
simulation.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.1, I review the IEEE
802.11 protocol and Bianchi’s model. I review some related work in Section 2.2.
In Section 2.3, I present my mathematical model to get an insight into the effect
of network parameters on the attacker’s benefit. Simulation results that verify my
analysis are given in Section 2.4. In Section 2.5, I discuss the detecting mechanisms
of carrier sense misbehavior and how to prevent misbehaving. Finally, I summarize
this chapter in Section 2.6.
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2.1 Background
I present my analysis in the context of IEEE 802.11 in this chapter. In this section,
I briefly present the basic knowledge required to understand subsequent sections.
2.1.1 IEEE 802.11 DCF
There are mainly two operation modes in the IEEE 802.11 medium access control
(MAC) protocol: point coordination function (PCF) and distributed coordination
function (DCF). While in PCF, a centralized arbiter schedules packets of stations
in a network, in DCF, each station determines when to transmit its packets by
sensing the shared medium. I focus only on DCF since it is hard for an attacker
to initiate selfish or malicious behavior by cheating on a carrier sense threshold
in PCF. DCF is basically based on carrier sense multiple access (CSMA). When
a station wishes to send a packet, the station senses a medium for a specified
time. If the station senses medium idle for distributed interframe space (DIFS),
it is allowed to transmit a frame including a high-layer data packet encapsulated
by MAC and Physical layer headers. If the station senses medium busy, it defers
to transmit a frame and starts a backoff procedure. At the first backoff stage, a
station randomly chooses a backoff counter from an interval ranging [0,W − 1]
where W is called the minimum contention window. A backoff counter decreases
by one with an idle medium for a specified slot time. When a medium is sensed
busy during the backoff, the backoff counter freezes until sensing a medium idle.
When the counter reaches zero, the station is allowed to transmit a frame. After
transmission of a frame, a sender waits for a corresponding acknowledgment for an
acknowledgment timeout (ACKTimeout) interval. When a receiver successfully
gets a frame, the receiver sends back an acknowledgment frame to the sender after
short interframe space (SIFS) which is less than the ACKTimeout interval. When
no acknowledgment arrives for the ACKTimeout interval, the sender initiates the
next stage of backoff by multiplying the contention window size by two. This
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procedure repeats until the successful reception of an acknowledgment. When
a station successfully gets back an acknowledgment, the station starts a backoff
procedure before sending a new packet.
Except the described procedure of carrier sensing and backoff, IEEE 802.11 DCF
has another type of carrier sensing: an optional virtual carrier sense that uses the
request-to-send/clear-to-send (RTS/CTS) handshake to reserve the medium prior
to transmission. In this chapter, I mainly focus on misbehaving a carrier sense
threshold and will discuss the effect of RTS/CTS as an prevention of misbehaving
a carrier sense threshold.
2.1.2 Bianchi Markov Chain Model
Here, I briefly introduce Bianchi Markov chain model [12] which will be used
in my analysis in Section 2.3. This model describes the IEEE 802.11 exponential
backoff procedure with the assumptions of ideal channel conditions (i.e. no hidden
terminals and captures), a fixed number of stations, and saturated traffic (i.e. each
station always has packets available for transmission).
Each state in the Markov chain model is represented as (i, k) where i indicates
the backoff stage and k represents the current backoff counter. The contention
window size at stage i is denoted by Wi. When I denote the minimum contention
window size by W , as in Section 2.1.1, Wi becomes Wi = 2
iW with the binary
exponential backoff. The maximum backoff stage is denoted by m. The collision
probability is p, which represents the probability of a collision seen by a packet
being transmitted on the channel. Then, the one-step transition probabilities are
as follows: 
P{i, k | i, k + 1} = 1 k ∈ (0,Wi − 2), i ∈ (0,m)
P{0, k | i, 0} = (1−p)
W0
k ∈ (0,W0 − 1), i ∈ (0,m)
P{i, k | i− 1, 0} = p
Wi
k ∈ (0,Wi − 1), i ∈ (1,m)
P{m, k | m, 0} = p
Wm
k ∈ (0,Wm − 1).
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Now, I denote the stationary probability of state (i, k) by bi,k. Then, I have the
following relation.  bi,0 = pib0,0 0 < i < mbm,0 = pmb0,0(1−p) .
Then, I have
bi,k =
Wi − k
Wi
bi,0 i ∈ (0,m), k ∈ (1,Wi − 1).
Finally, bi,k can be expressed as a function of b0,0 as follows: bi,k =
pi(Wi−k)
Wi
b0,0 i ∈ (0,m− 1), k ∈ (1,Wi − 1)
bm,k =
pm(Wm−k)
(1−p)Wm b0,0 k ∈ (1,Wi).
(2.1)
Now, b0,0 can be obtained by applying the normalization condition of the Markov
chain as follows:
1 =
m∑
i=0
Wi−1∑
k=0
bi,k =
m∑
i=0
bi,0 +
m∑
i=0
Wi−1∑
k=1
bi,k. (2.2)
Using (2.1), (2.2) gives
b0,0 =
2(1− 2p)(1− p)
(1− 2p)(W + 1) + pW (1− (2p)m) . (2.3)
From (2.3), the probability τ that a station transmits in a randomly chosen time
slot can be obtained as follows.
τ =
m∑
i=0
bi,0 =
2(1− 2p)
(1− 2p)(W + 1) + pW (1− (2p)m) . (2.4)
With the assumption that all stations’ transmission probability τ is the same,
constant, and independent of each other, I can get the equation
p = 1− (1− τ)n−1. (2.5)
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By solving (2.4) and (2.5), I can get the transmission probability τ and the collision
probability p. Also, I can express the throughput as a function of the computed
value τ [12].
2.2 Related Work
In this section, I to clarify the difference between my work and related work.
2.2.1 Carrier Sense Misbehavior
Pelechrinis et al. [9] discussed the effect of misbehaving carrier sense threshold
and proposed a mechanism to detect a misbehaving station. Their mechanism
consists of monitoring each station’s throughput in a domain and probing sus-
pected stations with a low power signal. Their monitoring component designates
a station as a potential attacker if it has higher throughput than the fair share
of network bandwidth. The amount of fair share is the total measured through-
put of all stations divided by the number of stations. Thereafter, their probing
component sends probing packets with low power to a potential attacker. If a
potential attacker does not respond to probing packets, it is considered an actual
attacker. They experimentally analyze the effect of carrier sense misbehavior on
the network. Their experimental setup does not cover all the spectrum of the
network parameters so that they show only the possible throughput benefit for
an attacker. I analytically show that there is a network parameter configuration
where an attacker cannot obtain throughput benefit.
Yang et al. [10] also studied the case of stations with different carrier sense
thresholds. Their results show that in some scenarios, a carrier-sense-misbehaving
station can achieve higher throughput than other legitimate stations. While their
work is based on a simulation and shows throughput mainly in terms of the
number of stations, my work develops an analytical model and considers more
diverse network parameters.
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Table 2.1: Notation.
N Number of stations m Maximum backoff stage
a Attacker t frame Time for frame transmission
n Normal user t ACK Time for ACK transmission
τx x’s transmission probability t SIFS Short interframe space
px x’s collision probability t DIFS Distributed interframe space
W Minimum contention window t slot Slot time
Park et al. [11] developed an analytical model to see if a carrier-sense-misbehaving
station is selfish or malicious. In their model, there are only one attacker and
one benign user in the network. They conclude that carrier sense misbehavior
achieves its selfish purpose. In contrast, my model enables me to capture the
effect of multiple users in the network. Moreover, my model shows that carrier
sense misbehavior does not always let an attacker achieve a selfish purpose.
2.2.2 Other Misbehavior in the MAC Layer
In addition to carrier sense threshold, backoff procedure is an important mecha-
nism for the fairness of nodes participating in a MAC protocol. Misbehavior in
backoff procedures in 802.11 MAC has been substantially studied [13–15]. In these
studies, game-theoretic frameworks have often played a key role for analyzing the
network behavior [14,15]. For example, it has been shown in [14] that the backoff
misbehavior leads to a significant unfair share of bandwidth between the attacker
and the well-behaved users. Then, an efficient game-theoretic framework has been
proposed to drive the network operating point to a pareto-optimal one [14].
2.3 Performance Analysis
In this section, I develop an analytical model to consider carrier sense misbehavior.
Notation used in the analysis is given in Table 2.1. I start my analysis with my
system descriptions.
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2.3.1 System Descriptions and Assumptions
Because my analytical model is based on Bianchi’s Markov chain model described
in Section 2.1.2, my model inherits its assumptions: ideal channel conditions
(i.e. no hidden terminals and captures) and a fixed number of stations. Another
inherited assumption is that all stations in my model always have packets to send.
In addition, I assume that all participating stations in my model are in the same
collision domain. In other words, all stations can hear signals from each other.
My system has N users: one attacker and N − 1 normal users. The attacker
has such a high carrier sense threshold that the attacker cannot sense all the
signals from other stations. Therefore, even though the attacker follows the backoff
procedure, the attacker ignores the ongoing transmission of normal users during
the exponential backoff procedure and attempts to transmit by decrementing its
backoff counter without freezing.
Figure 2.1 shows how an attacker and a normal user behave in case request-to-
send/clear-to-send (RTS/CTS) is unemployed (since typical 802.11 implementa-
tions disable the channel reservation by RTS/CTS). As shown in Figure 2.1(a),
an attacker does not freeze its backoff counter even in the case of other stations’
transmissions. In contrast, a normal station freezes a backoff after sensing other
stations’ transmissions in Figure 2.1(b).
My goal is to derive throughput of an attacker and normal users given an at-
tacker which attempts to increase its transmission opportunity by modifying the
carrier sense threshold. For the throughput in attack case, I have four variables:
collision probability of attacker pa, collision probability of normal user pn, trans-
mission probability of attacker τa, and transmission probability of normal user τn.
From (2.4) in Section 2.1.2 , I can get
τa =
2(1− 2pa)
(1− 2pa)(W + 1) + paW (1− (2pa)m) , (2.6)
τn =
2(1− 2pn)
(1− 2pn)(W + 1) + pnW (1− (2pn)m) . (2.7)
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To compute τa and τn, I need to obtain pa and pn.
2.3.2 Collision Probability of Attacker
As shown in Figure 2.1(a), pa is the probability that an attacker tries to transmit
during a time interval of collision of normal stations plus the probability that an
attacker tries to transmit when a normal station is transmitting.
A significant departure from Bianchi’s model comes from the fact that a normal
user’s time is different from attacker’s because an attacker does not freeze a backoff
counter during other stations’ transmissions. If there are N − 1 normal users and
no attacker, the probability of successful transmission represents
Prsuccess = (N − 1)τn(1− τn)N−2, (2.8)
and the probability of idle status becomes
Pridle = (1− τn)N−1. (2.9)
From (2.8) and (2.9), the probability of collision can be obtained as follows:
Prcollision = 1− Prsuccess − Pridle.
Now, I consider the attacker’s view. The probability p1 that an attacker tries
to transmit when a normal station is colliding with another normal station is
Prcollision × t framet slot
(1− Pridle)× t frame + t ACK + t SIFS + t DIFSt slot + Pridle
. (2.10)
In the same way, the probability p2 that an attacker tries to transmit when a
normal station is transmitting is
Prsuccess × t frame + t SIFS + t ACKt slot
(1− Pridle)× t frame + t ACK + t SIFS + t DIFSt slot + Pridle
. (2.11)
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Figure 2.2: Modified part of Markov chain model to calculate collision
probability of normal user.
From p1 in (2.10) and p2 in (2.11), I have the collision probability of the attacker
pa = p1 + p2. (2.12)
2.3.3 Collision Probability of Normal User
I now analyze the collision probability of a normal user. This differs from the
collision probability of the attacker because the normal user transmits less ag-
gressively. Figure 2.1(b) shows that the normal user freezes its backoff counter on
other stations’ transmissions.
Figure 2.2 shows the modified part of the Markov chain model (Fig. 4 in [12])
to calculate collision probability of normal user pn. An attacker can transmit a
packet even in a busy medium. In other words, an attacker can transmit on each
slot among the number of required slots x for finishing the transmission of normal
user:
x = (t frame + t SIFS + t ACK)/t slot. (2.13)
To succeed in transmission of normal user’s transmission, collision does not
happen during x slots. Therefore, if the probability of collision at slot i is called
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Table 2.2: Parameters used in the analytical model and ns-2 simulation.
RTS/CTS Disabled MAC PDU size 40 bytes
W 31 Data rate 1 Mbps
m 7 Slot time 20 µs
SIFS 10 µs
pi, the collision probability of normal user pn becomes
1− pn =
x−1∏
i=0
(1− pi). (2.14)
Collision can happen at slot 0 by simultaneous transmission of other N − 2
normal stations or by an attacker transmitting. Therefore, p0 represents
1− p0 = (1− τn)N−2(1− τa). (2.15)
Collision can happen at slot i (i 6= 0) by an attacker transmitting in a busy
medium.
1− pi = (1− τa). (2.16)
From (2.13), (2.14), (2.15), and (2.16), I have
pn = 1− (1− τn)N−2(1− τa)(t frame + t SIFS + t ACK)/t slot. (2.17)
2.3.4 Model Validation
In this section, I validate my developed model by comparing my simulation results
(ns-2.34). To saturate the link (i.e. the transmission queue of each user is always
nonempty), I generate uplink UDP traffic of 1 Mbps from each user to the access
point. Table 2.2 shows the parameters that I use for both the analytical model
and the simulation runs. For accuracy, no ad-Hoc routing agent (NOAH) [16], a
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Figure 2.3: Collision probability: analysis versus simulation.
wireless routing agent that only supports direct communication between wireless
stations or between access points and wireless stations, is adopted in ns-2. In
addition, the address resolution protocol (ARP) is disabled. Therefore, any rout-
ing / ARP - related packets are not sent. I performed 20 runs of 90 simulated
seconds. Standard deviation of results were very small around 0.001.
Figure 2.3 shows that the analytical model is comparatively accurate; analytical
results (lines) coincide with the simulation results (symbols: square represents
collision probability of the attacker and circle represents the normal user’s) even
though there are some differences for a small numbers of stations. As Bianchi
mentioned in [12], the reason is an assumption of Bianchi’s model– the collision
probability of each station is constant and independent regardless of the number
of retransmissions already suffered – is not valid in a simulation. This assumption
results in better accuracy as long as the number of stations gets larger [12].
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2.4 Simulation Study
In this section, I analyze the impact of attacker misbehaving carrier sense thresh-
old on system performance in a variety of network environments.
As described in Section 2.1.2, throughput is a function of transmission probabil-
ity τ . From (2.6) and (2.7), I know that transmission probabilities of an attacker
and a normal user are respectively expressed as functions of collision probability
pa and pn. I have the equations pa and pn in (2.12) and (2.17). From these equa-
tions, I can know that the throughput is decided by the variables: the number of
stations (N), MAC PDU size (t frame), data rate (t frame, t ACK), and slot
time (t slot).
I perform a simulation study with these four variables. I use ns-2.34 and con-
sider uplink saturated traffic as described in Section 2.3.4. The default parameters
in Table 2.2 are used, except the variable: MAC PDU size, data rate, and slot
time. For each given value of N , I performed 20 runs of 90 simulated seconds. 40
bytes or 1500 bytes is chosen as the MAC PDU size because the majority of the
packets in the Internet are 40-byte packets which carry TCP acknowledgments
but no payload, or 1500-byte packets. In my simulation, all users are located on a
circle centered at the access point with a radius of ten meters. The normal users
and the attacker are given identical properties (such as signal and noise power
levels), except that their carrier sense threshold differs. That is, the attacker is
identical to a normal user except he ignores all the signals from other normal
stations.
I consider MAC-layer throughput per user in an 802.11b network. The data
rate is 11 Mbps and slot time is 20 µs. I call this case with MAC PDU size of 1500
bytes the baseline case. Figure 2.4(a) shows the results for the baseline case. An
attacker gets approximately 1.2 Mbps more during attack when N is two (i.e. one
attacker and one normal user). However, the attacker’s benefit disappears when
N is four. Moreover, as N increases, attack is not too harmful to normal users.
Figure 2.4(b) shows the results when I modify MAC PDU size from 1500 bytes
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Table 2.3: Collision probability of attacker and normal user: 802.11b network
(MAC PDU size: 40 bytes, data rate: 11 Mbps, slot time: 20 µs).
N pa (Analysis) pn (Analysis) pa (Simulation) pn (Simulation)
2 0.2241 0.4062 0.1906 0.3489
3 0.4441 0.2618 0.3731 0.2272
4 0.5302 0.2363 0.4822 0.2014
5 0.5709 0.2445 0.5418 0.2101
6 0.5936 0.2604 0.5822 0.2184
7 0.6074 0.2777 0.6051 0.2349
8 0.6163 0.2945 0.6169 0.2558
9 0.6221 0.3103 0.6288 0.2664
10 0.6261 0.3250 0.6383 0.2790
to 40 bytes compared to the baseline case. As the baseline case in Figure 2.4(a),
when N is two, an attacker can be selfish. In addition, the loss to the normal
user is small when N is five or above. However, in contrast to the baseline case,
an attacker is just malicious not selfish when N is three or four. Table 2.3 shows
the collision probability of attacker and normal user from simulation and analysis.
Analytical results coincide with the simulation results.
In Figure 2.5, I consider MAC-layer throughput per user in an 802.11b and
802.11g mixed network. I modify only the data rate from 11 Mbps to 54 Mbps
compared to the baseline case. The trends of the graphs are very similar to
those in Figure 2.4(b) despite the big difference of throughput scale. I know that
t frame is expressed as MAC PDU size over data rate. Decreasing MAC PDU
size from 1500 bytes to 40 bytes makes t frame in Figure 2.4(b) smaller than
t frame in Figure 2.4(a). Similarly, increasing the data rate in Figure 2.5 reduces
the t frame that might make the results similar.
Finally, I consider MAC-layer throughput per user in an 802.11g network. I
only modify the slot time from 20 µs to 9 µs compared to the case in Figure 2.5.
Figure 2.6 shows that the trends are quite similar to those in the previous figures.
The difference from Figure 2.5 is that an attacker is changed from being malicious
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Figure 2.4: Throughput per station: 802.11b network (data rate: 11 Mbps, slot
time: 20 µs).
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Figure 2.5: Throughput per station: 802.11b and 802.11g mixed network (MAC
PDU size: 1500 bytes, data rate: 54 Mbps, slot time: 20 µs).
to being selfish when N is three or four.
2.5 Discussion
In this section, I discuss mechanisms to detect a carrier-sense-misbehaving at-
tacker and a countermeasure that mitigates the attack.
As described in Section 2.2, Pelechrinis et al. [9] proposed the detecting mech-
anism by probing packets with low power. This mechanism basically assumed
that the radio channel is symmetric and consistent, because it derived the power
of probing packets from the received signal strength (from a potential attacker).
However, recent research [17] reported the asymmetry and variation of 802.11
wireless channels. Therefore, I guess that behind the suggested detection mech-
anism lurks the high possibility of false positives or false negatives. Another
potential problem of this mechanism is that an attacker can elude the probing
19
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Figure 2.6: Throughput per station: 802.11g network (MAC PDU size: 1500
bytes, data rate: 54 Mbps, slot time: 9 µs).
by having a separate power threshold lower than the carrier sense threshold and
using that threshold to decode a probing packet.
Paul et al. [18] recently suggested another detecting method by passive monitor-
ing. The weakness of this mechanism is that 802.11 retransmissions were ignored
due to the complexity of the mechanism.
Even though the mechanism to detect a carrier-sense-misbehaving attacker is
hard to implement in an 802.11 network, in the case of an 802.11 access point net-
work, I may mitigate the attack using a request-to-send/clear-to-send (RTS/CTS)
handshake in the uplink channel (from stations to an access point). A carrier-
sense-misbehaving attacker ignores all the signals from all other stations except
an access point. If other stations send an RTS to an access point to reserve the
channel, an access point broadcasts a CTS in the response of the RTS. An attacker
cannot intentionally ignore this CTS because ignoring this CTS means that the
attacker cannot receive a CTS from an access point when it sends an RTS.
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Bellardo and Savage [19] and Hu et al. [20] presented a scheme exploiting the
virtual carrier sense mechanism. The 802.11 standard specifies that the MAC
frame header of all packets should contain a duration field, which specifies how
long others have to wait before transmission is allowed in order to avoid collision.
This feature is principally used by RTS/CTS. Stations update their network allo-
cation vector (NAV) with this duration information and keep quiet for the spec-
ified duration. Thus, an attacker can repeatedly request long channel occupancy
time, thereby starving normal users of channel occupancy. However, the duration
field attack does not work in many real systems because most vendors do not
implement the 802.11 specification correctly [19].
Therefore, to adopt RTS/CTS in an 802.11 uplink as the countermeasure of
a carrier-sense-misbehaving attack, I should solve two problems. First, the de-
scribed function related to the duration field should be implemented properly.
Second, the countermeasure for exploiting the virtual carrier sense mechanism
should be considered. A simple countermeasure can be that the access point
readjusts the duration field in the CTS when an attacker requests long channel
occupancy time in the RTS.
2.6 Summary
I presented an analytic study of carrier sense misbehavior. In particular, I tried
to understand which effect an attacker cheating on the carrier sense threshold can
achieve under different network parameters: selfish or malicious. I developed a
mathematical model to consider diverse network parameters. With simulation,
I could see that under different sets of network parameters, an attacker could
achieve different effects. My work shows that an attacker cannot always achieve
its selfish purpose; a point which is not emphasized by prior work.
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CHAPTER 3
PARTIAL DEAFNESS: A NOVEL
DENIAL-OF-SERVICE ATTACK IN 802.11
NETWORKS
Wireless networks based on the IEEE 802.11 standard [2] are widely deployed to-
day for governmental, commercial, and personal uses. Attacks against the 802.11
standard can cause widespread security problems ranging from mere inconve-
nience to privacy breaches and machine compromise. Much attention has been
dedicated to both possible attacks and their respective solutions. For example,
the original security scheme specified by 802.11, wired equivalent privacy (WEP),
has been shown to be susceptible to various attacks against both the encryption
mechanism [21–23] and the authentication scheme [19]. Many protocols have been
proposed to fix these weaknesses [4, 24,25].
Other aspects of the 802.11 standard are also known to be susceptible to at-
tacks. For example, the virtual carrier sense mechanism is susceptible to a type of
denial-of-service (DoS) attack where an attacker repeatedly reserves the channel
for long transmissions, thereby starving other users of any transmission oppor-
tunities [19]. Many attacks target the backoff mechanism of the 802.11 standard
by not backing off as much as specified by the standard [13, 26, 27]. Backing off
less than specified allows the attackers to obtain more access opportunities and,
hence, higher throughput, than legitimate users.
Heusse et al. demonstrate that even without any malicious intent or misbehav-
ior, a slow connection can still significantly impact the transfer speed of a fast
connection because of the fairness mechanism implemented by the distributed co-
ordination function (DCF) at the medium access control (MAC) layer [28]. In
particular, since the IEEE 802.11 DCF seeks to fairly grant access opportunities
to each station, each station has an equal opportunity to be the next station to
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transmit a data packet; thus, a fast connection regularly has to wait until a slow
connection finishes its reception. This performance anomaly together with exces-
sive channel reservation can be viewed as head-of-queue blocking at the wireless
medium since the DCF cannot schedule the next station until the current trans-
mitter is finished.
In this chapter, I present the partial deafness attack, a novel DoS attack that
builds on Heusse et al.’s observation. My attack is based on the realization that
many commercial access points are implemented with only a single data queue,
since the 802.11 standard does not specify or recommend any queuing behavior.
Thus, if a transmitted packet is not acknowledged, the packet triggers retransmis-
sions and possible rate adaptation (i.e. slowing the data rate), thereby creating
head-of-queue blocking at the access point. The head-of-queue blocking then
drastically degrades the performance of the wireless network.
Like other DoS attacks, my attack does not aim to give better performance
to the attacker, but rather reduces the performance of other users. In my at-
tack, each attacker artificially worsens his link quality by intentionally failing
to acknowledge packet receptions. My attack impacts the system in a manner
similar to a legitimate user with a slow connection. However, by exploiting the
retransmission mechanism specified by the 802.11 standard, the impact of my at-
tack becomes much more devastating, especially to the transport control protocol
(TCP) performance of other users.
My work is novel and interesting for three reasons. First, the attacker can
carry out my attack targeting the MAC protocol without modifying the MAC
layer; second, my attack can consistently impact the system regardless of the
opportunistic nature of the physical layer; and, finally, the attack can be mitigated
at either the MAC or network layers.
My proposed attack targets the MAC-layer protocol but does not require the
attacker to modify the MAC protocol implementation at his station. For example,
an attacker can suppress an acknowledgment by turning off the network interface
card any time between the start and completion of packet reception. In contrast
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to many previously proposed attacks that require substantial modification of the
firmware or the hardware and are thus often deemed impractical, my attack can
be easily implemented in several ways, including methods that do not directly
modify the MAC-layer implementation. For example, in Section 3.4, I detail
my implementation of a partial deafness attacker by enabling and disabling the
acknowledgment function in the driver of a commercial wireless local area network
(WLAN) card. In other words, my attack works even when the attacker abides
by the same MAC rules as does every other node.
An attacker can simply move farther away from the access point to physically
worsen his channel condition and impact other users. However, this approach re-
quires the attacker to find a location such that the channel condition is sufficiently
weak to regularly result in retransmission, and yet is not weak enough to result in
disassociation. If fading causes the attacker to be disconnected, then the attacker
cannot impact other users; on the other hand, if fading improves the attacker’s
channel condition intermittently, then other users can also experience improved
transfer rate intermittently. My attack suppresses the acknowledgment and thus
allows an attacker to be able to consistently worsen his channel condition over
time, and cause significant degradation of service to other users.
A final interesting property of my attack is that attack mitigation can be ad-
dressed at several points. One possible modification for attack mitigation is to
alter the MAC layer so that everyone who gets access to the channel is able to
use it for the same amount of time; this mechanism can be implemented us-
ing the transmission opportunity (TXOP) mechanism specified by the 802.11e
amendment [29]. An alternative way to solve this problem is a network-layer ap-
proach. When the access is primarily through an access point, the access point
can maintain a separate queue for each client and alternate among the queues
in a time-fair manner. I implement both techniques to mitigate the proposed
attack. Specifically, I use MAC-layer and network-layer mechanisms to enforce
time fairness instead of access opportunity fairness so that clients are not starved
when attackers cause unnecessary retransmissions.
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: In Section 3.1, I overview the
IEEE 802.11 standard and the two transport-layer protocols I use to evaluate the
effectiveness of my approaches: the transport control protocol (TCP) and the user
datagram protocol (UDP). Readers familiar with these protocols can safely skip
this section. In Section 3.2, I review some related work. In Section 3.3, I detail my
attack and analytically show the effect of my attack. I show in Section 3.4 that my
attack is indeed practical and causes severe degradation of network performance.
In Section 3.5, I detail a time-fair mechanism and show that this mechanism
mitigates the partial deafness attack. I summarize this chapter in Section 3.7.
3.1 Overview of IEEE 802.11, TCP, and UDP
3.1.1 IEEE 802.11
The IEEE 802.11 standard [2] in its various forms is now widely implemented and
deployed in wireless networks. In infrastructure mode, users share the wireless
medium in order to download and upload data via an access point. The IEEE
802.11 standard specifies multiple transmission rates that a station can choose
among based on the signal strength and link quality between the communicating
stations. There is a natural tradeoff between the transmission rate and error
rate dictated by the rate distortion theorem [30]. Rate adaptation algorithms
such as Auto Rate Fallback (ARF) [31] and SampleRate [32] have been widely
implemented to adaptively choose an optimal transmission rate as link quality
varies. Rate diversity is thus common in any 802.11 network.
At the medium access control (MAC) layer, the IEEE 802.11 standard specifies
methods to fairly share the wireless link among users. The distributed coor-
dination function (DCF) is the predominant MAC protocol in today’s wireless
networks. It seeks to fairly share the medium by offering equal access opportu-
nity to all users. Another MAC protocol is specified in the 802.11 standard: the
point coordination function (PCF); however, few vendors implement the PCF.
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The DCF provides access opportunity fairness by using random backoff. Each
station in 802.11 maintains a contention window (CW). After any broadcast
transmission or successful unicast transmission, the contention window is reset
to CWmin, and it never increases beyond a value CWmax. When station A wishes
to send a frame, it first performs carrier sensing for the DCF interframe space
(DIFS)1 to determine whether or not the medium is busy. If the medium is not
busy for that entire period, then A can immediately send the data frame; other-
wise, A picks a random backoff value uniformly distributed over interval [0,CW],
where CW is the current value of the contention window. Each time the medium
is no longer busy, A waits DIFS, and if the medium is still not busy, decrements
its backoff value by one for every slot time the medium continues to be free. When
A detects that the channel is once again busy, it stops decrementing the backoff
value and repeats the process of waiting for the channel to become idle, waiting
for a DIFS, and counting down its remaining backoff value. Once A’s backoff
value reaches zero, A starts its transmission.
When B successfully receives a unicast transmission from A, B waits for a
short interframe space (SIFS) and, if the channel is idle, immediately returns an
acknowledgment. Thus, if a station A sends a unicast transmission and does not
receive a MAC-layer acknowledgment for that transmission, A will believe that the
packet did not successfully reach B (broadcast messages are not acknowledged, so
they are always considered successful; previous work has shown that such packets
are therefore delivered less reliably [33]). A will then retransmit the unsuccessful
frame following an exponential backoff procedure. The contention window for the
nth transmission is given by
CW[1] = CWmin
CW[n] = min (2CW[n− 1] + 1,CWmax)
and A’s station retry count is incremented by one. If the station retry count
1DIFS = SIFS + 2 × slot time; SIFS and slot time are listed in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1: Slot time, short interframe space (SIFS), minimum and maximum
contention window (CW) values of the corresponding transmission mode in the
physical layer: frequency hopping spread Spectrum (FHSS), direct sequence
spread spectrum (DSSS), infrared (IR), and orthogonal frequency-division
multiplexing (OFDM).
PHY mode Slot time SIFS CWmin CWmax
FHSS 50 µs 28 µs 15 1023
DSSS 20 µs 10 µs 31 1023
IR 8 µs 10 µs 63 1023
OFDM 9 µs 16 µs 15 1023
exceeds the retry limit,2 the frame is discarded; otherwise, A chooses a new backoff
value on the interval [0,CW[n]] and repeats the process of waiting for a DIFS and
counting down the backoff time as it did for the original transmission.
The slot time, SIFS, and contention window are dictated by the transmission
mode at the physical layer. Table 3.1 shows various physical layer transmission
modes with their corresponding slot time, SIFS, and contention window.
The original DCF has been amended to incorporate the IEEE 802.11e stan-
dard [29]. The 802.11e standard specifies an enhanced distributed coordination
function (EDCF) that allows a sender to prioritize each packet based on the pur-
pose of that packet. For example, voice over wireless LAN packets are given
higher priority than data packets (such as web traffic and emails). The packets
are classified into access categories based on their purposes. The 802.11e standard
specifies four categories: background, best effort, voice, and video.
EDCF grants access priority by modifying the DCF’s contention window and
interframe spacing. In particular, a possibly distinct CWmin, CWmax, and arbi-
trary interframe space (AIFS) is assigned to each service class, so that on average,
packets in higher-priority access categories are deferred less than packets in lower-
priority access categories, and thus enjoy faster service. EDCF also allows the
2The 802.11 standard specifies two retry limits: 7 retransmissions when channel reservation
is not used and 4 when it is used. Since typical implementations disable the channel reservation
by request-to-send/clear-to-send (RTS/CTS), the retransmission limit is usually 7.
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access point to specify a transmission opportunity (TXOP) limit for each access
category. When a station operating under the EDCF determines that it can send
a packet from a specific access category, it sets the medium occupancy timer to the
current time plus the TXOP limit for that access category. It may then transmit
as many frames as it wishes from the same access category prior to the expiration
of the medium occupancy timer, provided that the initial transmission and any
expected acknowledgment of any such frame is completed prior to the expiration
of the medium occupancy timer. A station can ensure that this condition is met
by fragmenting its frames so that the initial transmission of each fragment fits
within the medium occupancy timer. (Lower-rate retransmissions are allowed to
exceed the TXOP limit.)
3.1.2 TCP
The transport control protocol (TCP) is the predominant transport-layer proto-
col used in today’s Internet. As a result, any practical MAC layer should have
properties conducive to good TCP performance. TCP is a conforming protocol,
meaning that it adjusts its sending rate based on the performance of the network.
Each TCP flow tries to estimate the amount of unacknowledged data that the
network can handle. This estimate, called the congestion window, grows every
time a packet is successfully delivered, and shrinks every time a packet is lost.
In steady-state, the congestion window should be within a factor of 2 of the true
bandwidth-delay product (that is, the available bandwidth times the round-trip
time). TCP is a self-clocking protocol, which means that a sender decides to send
a packet when it receives an acknowledgment from the receiver. A consistent flow
of acknowledgments is therefore needed in order to maintain a high level of TCP
performance.
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3.1.3 UDP
The user datagram protocol (UDP) is another common transport-layer protocol.
UDP is an unreliable protocol and presents a non-conforming load, so it simply
sends every application-level packet as a best-effort network-layer datagram. That
is, UDP does not try to guarantee packet delivery or to avoid congestion; it simply
transmits one packet at a time without regard to what happened to previous
packets.
3.2 Related Work
The IEEE 802.11 standard is widely deployed due to the unlicensed spectrum
in which it operates and the low cost of client devices and access points. As a
result, the security of the 802.11 attracts much attention. Most research on MAC
security focuses on the requirements of confidentiality and integrity. The original
security protocol, WEP, is designed to provide privacy and authenticity of data.
However, Fluhrer et al. note that weakness in the encryption algorithm used
by WEP can be exploited to allow the discovery of session keys [21]. Numerous
related attacks exist in the literature [22, 23].
While a cryptographic attack has strong adverse effects on users’ privacy and a
protocol’s confidentiality and integrity, my work considers another type of attack
where the attacker seeks only to deny service to other users. That is, the at-
tacker aims to reduce a protocol’s availability. Specifically, I consider the attacks
against the MAC-layer protocol specified in 802.11 rather than the pure resource
consumption attacks such as the jamming attack (e.g. jamming attack exploiting
clear channel assessment [34]).
Attacks on the 802.11 MAC protocol can exploit management vulnerabilities.
Bellardo and Savage implement and demonstrate an attack that targets the au-
thentication/association scheme of 802.11 [19]. Bellardo and Savage note that the
deauthentication and disassociation messages are not encrypted, thus an attacker
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can easily forge these messages. The attacker can then send the deauthentica-
tion message to the access point before client’s data is received, or the attacker
can send the disassociation message to the client before the client’s data is trans-
mitted. The deauthentication/disassociation attack is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
Ferreri et al. [35] describe DoS attacks against an access point’s association and
authentication mechanisms.
Attacks on the 802.11 MAC can also exploit media access vulnerabilities. Bel-
lardo and Savage also note that the 802.11 carrier sense mechanism can be easily
exploited. For example, in 802.11 networks, a node can only send data during a
certain time period after the channel stops being busy. In particular, if not due to
retransmission or fragmentation, a user can only transmit data DCF interframe
space (DIFS) after a channel is available; otherwise, the user can transmit data
short interframe space (SIFS) after, where SIFS < DIFS. A very simple method
to deny service is to send a short burst every SIFS. 802.11 uses a different SIFS
for each physical layer transmission mode; the numbers are shown in Table 3.1.
Bellardo and Savage [19] and Hu et al. [20] present a more sophisticated scheme
exploiting the virtual carrier sense mechanism. The 802.11 standard specifies
that the MAC frame header of all packets should contain a duration field, which
specifies how long others have to wait before transmission is allowed in order to
avoid collision. Users update their network allocation vector (NAV) with this
duration information and keep quiet for the specified duration. Thus, an attacker
can repeatedly request long channel occupancy time, thereby starving normal
clients of channel occupancy.
The benefit of attacking the duration field rather than sending a short burst
every SIFS is the amount of power used to carry out the attack. In the du-
ration field attack, an attacker simply initiates a request-to-send/clear-to-send
(RTS/CTS) handshake along with the specified duration. The handshake in the-
ory could keep the channel busy for roughly 30 ms. The short burst approach, on
the other hand, requires sending a short burst every SIFS, or 10 µs in 802.11b/g
networks. My proposed attack performs even better in terms of power saving
30
Client Attacker AP
Authentication Request
Authentication Response
Association Request
Association Response
Deauthentication
Deauthentication
Data
(a) Deauthentication attack.
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(b) Disassociation attack.
Figure 3.1: Illustration of the deauthentication and disassociation attacks.
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for the attackers; in particular, my attack can easily occupy 100 ms of channel
time without having to send any messages. Moreover, my attack does not require
the attacker to have better service, higher power, or closer distance to the access
point. Finally, unlike my attack, which works on each access point I tested, the
duration field attack does not work in many real systems because most vendors
do not implement the 802.11 specification correctly [19].
Heusse et al. point out that when a client uses a lower bit rate than others in a
802.11 network, the performance of all clients is considerably degraded [28]. Tan
and Guttag subsequently suggest that time fairness can mitigate this performance
anomaly and provide better throughput for the WLAN [36]. In this chapter, I
present an attacker that exploits the conclusion of Heusse et al. by artificially and
intentionally creating rate disparities. I show that access point retransmissions
exacerbate the anomaly by creating head-of-queue blocking at the access point’s
data queue. I then adapt the principle of Tan and Guttag’s solution and show
how to mitigate my attack by implementing time fairness at the access point’s
data queue.
3.3 The Partial Deafness Attack
3.3.1 Description
In this section, I present my novel partial deafness attack, which exploits the
retransmission mechanism of the 802.11 protocol to reduce the bandwidth of non-
attacking nodes. In my attack, the attacker, upon receiving a unicast data frame
addressed to it, intentionally fails to send a timely acknowledgment for at least
a portion of those data frames. Though previous work has suggested denial-of-
service attacks against IEEE 802.11, my attack stands out because it substantially
reduces the bandwidth available to legitimate nodes without requiring the attacker
to have superior connection quality. That is, an attacker with lower transmission
power, fewer computation resources, and located farther away than a normal client
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Figure 3.2: Partial deafness attack.
can still deny service to all the normal clients within the network.
As illustrated in Figure 3.2, when a unicast transmission is not acknowledged,
an 802.11 station will normally transmit a frame up to seven times before it gives
up and discards the frame. An attacker can thus fail to acknowledge the first six
transmissions. In addition, senders in 802.11 employ rate adaptation (e.g. Auto
Rate Fallback (ARF) [31] or SampleRate [32]) to maximize the throughput of
the channel. When a receiver repeatedly fails to receive transmissions at one bit
rate, the sender chooses a lower bit rate in an attempt to successfully deliver the
packet. Eventually the sender will choose the lowest possible rate, called the base
rate, to deliver packets to the attacker.
Since most 802.11 networks are infrastructure networks in which clients connect
directly to an access point, and most traffic is directed to or received from an access
point, the behavior of an access point plays an important role in the fairness
perceived by a station. The 802.11 standard does not specify or recommend
any queuing behavior at the access point, so many commercial access points use
a single queue. Thus, all packets are treated with the same priority and each
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packet is completed before subsequent packets can be serviced, regardless of the
number of retransmissions, or the rate that is selected for those retransmissions.
The attacker can thus induce the access point to spend a large amount of time
transmitting to the attacker, thereby drastically decreasing the time allocated to
the normal clients and reducing the overall throughput.
3.3.2 Analysis
I will first analyze the impact of my attack in 802.11b, where the maximum
rate is 11 Mbps and the base rate is 1 Mbps. I then use a theoretical analysis
to show that rate diversity exacerbates the problem; thus, commonly deployed
802.11b/g networks, where the maximum and base rates are respectively 54 Mbps
and 1 Mbps, are even more susceptible to my attack.
To quantify the degree of imbalance caused by the partial deafness attack, I
consider a case in which a normal client and a malicious client share one base
station. I call the normal client Alice, the malicious client, Mallory, and the base
station, Bob. In my example, Alice and Mallory have the same link quality to
Bob, so when Mallory is not performing an attack, Bob can send to both Alice
and Mallory at 11 Mbps. That is, if Alice and Mallory started 11-Mbps user
datagram protocol (UDP) downloads, they would each receive approximately half
of the available bandwidth.
Let us consider the particular rate adaptation algorithm implemented on a
Linksys WRT54G access point. Initially, Bob’s rate adaptation chooses 11 Mbps
for its first three transmissions and 2 Mbps for its last four retransmissions. If
Mallory acknowledges after the third transmission, Bob determines that 11 Mbps
is too high an initial rate, and will send the subsequent packet at 5.5 Mbps for the
first three transmissions and 1 Mbps for the next four retransmissions. If Mallory
again acknowledges after the third transmission, Bob determines that 5.5 Mbps
is again too high an initial rate, and will send the subsequent packet at 2 Mbps
for the first three transmissions and 1 Mbps for the next four retransmissions. If
34
Mallory again acknowledges after the third transmission, Bob will determine that
2 Mbps is still too high and will send all subsequent packets at 1 Mbps.
If Mallory performs the partial deafness attack, and she does not acknowledge
receiving a packet until the seventh transmission, Bob would send packets to
Mallory at 1 Mbps in the steady state, but to Alice at 11 Mbps. Thus, it would
take Bob 11 times longer to send an identical packet to Mallory than to Alice.
In other words, if Bob sends an equal number of packets to Alice and Mallory,
without considering retransmission, Mallory is already allocated 11
12
(91.7%) of the
channel occupancy time as opposed to 50% in a time-fair scheme.
I now consider the effect of retransmissions on contention window. In the direct
sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) mode of 802.11b, the slot time is 20 µs, and
the minimum and maximum contention window sizes are 31 and 1023. Typically,
802.11 networks are configured to allow a maximum transmission unit of around
2304 bytes. In 802.11, a station can fragment larger packets into smaller fragments
and transmit each fragment separately. In this case, Mallory allows Bob to send
each fragment the maximum number of times before Bob gives up on the fragment;
then Mallory acknowledges the final transmission. Thus, each fragment of the
packet is transmitted seven times, which is nearly equivalent to transmitting the
entire packet seven times. (There are minor differences because of the interframe
spacing used between fragments, but seven retransmissions of one large frame
closely approximates seven retransmissions of each of several smaller fragments.)
I now quantify Mallory’s per-packet channel occupancy time in steady-state. I
assume that every time the sender (in this case Bob) wishes to send a packet, the
medium is busy, so the first transmission experiences backoff. I further assume
that once the medium becomes idle, there are no further transmissions on that
medium except those initiated by Bob. I will validate the theoretical results here
with implementation results in Section 3.4, which show that these assumptions
provide results comparable to those seen in normal access point behaviors. I will
consider a single UDP packet containing 1470 bytes of data, which, after UDP-
and Internet Protocol (IP)-layer headers, comes to 1498 bytes. The addition of
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MAC-layer headers brings the total to 1534 bytes.
If Alice and Mallory both acknowledge reception of a packet by the third trans-
mission, the steady-state data rate is 11 Mbps. In this case, the first transmission
takes about 1571.6 µs in expectation: 50 µs for DIFS, 310 µs of expected backoff,
96 µs of preamble, and 1115.6 µs of data. Bob would expect an acknowledgment
within 126 µs, which represents the sum of the SIFS that Mallory must wait follow-
ing reception, the maximum propagation delay between Mallory and Bob, which
is defined in 802.11 to be one slot time, and the delay that 802.11 allows between
when the radio frequency energy starts impinging on the receiver until that re-
ceiver starts receiving a message, which is defined to be the length of the preamble.
In expectation, a failed first transmission would therefore be detected 1697.6 µs
after the medium becomes idle. When the first transmission is successful, Mallory
waits SIFS and transmits a preamble and a 12-byte acknowledgment at 2 Mbps,
which gives an expected time of 1725.6 µs from when the medium is idle until the
transmission is received. (I assume the propagation time is negligible; the 20 µs
slot time of 802.11 is sufficient for a 6-km transmission, which is well in excess of
typical 802.11 transmission distances.) In further retransmissions, the one thing
that changes is the expected backoff value, which increases from 310 µs to 630 µs
to 1270 µs within these first three retransmissions. Also, Bob will not wait DIFS
when Bob does not receive an acknowledgment. Thus, success after three retrans-
missions takes 1697.6 + (1647.6 + 320) + (1675.6 + 320 + 640) = 6300.8 µs.
If Mallory forces three retransmissions for each packet while Alice acknowledges
every first transmission, then Mallory will capture 6300.8
6300.8 + 1725.6
(78.5%) of the
channel occupancy time.
When Bob must regularly transmit each packet at least four times in order to
reach Mallory, Bob sends every packet to Mallory at 1 Mbps. Thus, each data
transmission takes 12272 µs for data alone, which, after adding backoff, pream-
ble, and header for the first transmission, takes 12678 µs. The acknowledgment
times out after the same 126 µs, giving a failure time for the first transmission
of 12804 µs. Thereafter, each failure takes the same amount of time after adjust-
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ment for backoff, and when the acknowledgment finally comes, it is transmitted
at 1 Mbps, so seven retransmissions takes 50 + 12678 ∗ 7 + 126 ∗ 6 +
backoff increases + 202 (µs), where 50 µs is DIFS, 12678 µs is the time that each
packet transmission takes, 126 µs is the time to detect that an acknowledgment
is not forthcoming, and 202 µs is the time to finish receiving an acknowledgment.
The total additional backoff for seven retransmissions is 28160 µs in expectation,
so the total transmission time is 117914 µs. If Mallory forces six retransmissions
(for a total of seven transmissions) for each packet while Alice acknowledges every
first transmission, then Mallory will capture 117914
117914 + 1725.6
(98.6%) of the channel
occupancy time.
Finally, I argue that rate diversification exacerbates the partial deafness attack.
In the same scenario, when Alice uses a 54 Mbps link in a 802.11b/g network,
Mallory’s transmissions take the same amount of time, but Alice’s transmissions
are now much faster. The DIFS and backoff take 360 µs as before (because it
is a mixed-mode 802.11b/g access point), 802.11g does not require a preamble,
and Alice’s data transmission is now 227.3 µs, for a forward transmission time of
587.3 µs; after a 10 µs 802.11g SIFS and a 30 µs 802.11g acknowledgment, each
of Alice’s packets take 627.3 µs in expectation. Thus Alice’s channel occupancy
time drops further to 0.53%.
3.4 Implementation and Evaluation of the Partial
Deafness Attack
In this section, I detail my implementation of a partial deafness attacker and
observe that the attack does in fact impact the data rate greatly.
3.4.1 Implementation
I implemented a partial deafness attacker to see the effect of the attack on an
802.11 network. My implementation uses commercial off-the-shelf 802.11 network
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interface cards (NICs). Most commodity 802.11 NICs generate and send acknowl-
edgment frames automatically in firmware whenever a packet is received, because
of the hard real-time deadlines on generating acknowledgments. The partial deaf-
ness attack can then be implemented by building custom hardware, modifying the
firmware to defer acknowledgments, or turning off the network interface card any
time between the start and completion of packet reception.
In order to simplify the task of deferring packet acknowledgments, I chose to
modify the MadWifi driver, which is a Linux kernel device driver for Atheros-based
WLAN devices. The Atheros chipset does not load a firmware onto the card, but
instead relies on a hardware abstraction layer (HAL) module that is part of the
driver. The HAL module defines the interface between the hardware and other
software in the device driver to manage many of the chip-specific operations and
to enforce any relevant regulations. The normal operation of the Atheros card is
illustrated in Figure 3.3(a).
I modified MadWifi to control a particular register in the HAL module that
allows me to enable and disable packet acknowledgments. The modified behavior
of the Atheros card is illustrated in Figure 3.3(b). As illustrated in Figure 3.2, I
suppressed acknowledgments from the first n−1th transmissions by switching the
HAL register.
My evaluation network consists of a traffic source connected to an IEEE 802.11b/g
access point. A normal user and an attacker use 802.11 to connect to the ac-
cess point. This topology is illustrated in Figure 3.4. I use two different kinds
of access points in my experiment. When I do not need to modify the access
point queuing algorithms, I use commercial off-the-shelf access points such as the
Linksys WRT54G, which uses the Broadcom BCM5352EKPB chipset and sup-
ports 802.11b/g mixed mode, because it shows how the rate adaption is actually
implemented in a real 802.11 system. When I need to modify the access point
queuing algorithms, I use HostAP on a Pentium-III 1 GHz laptop running Linux
2.6.24 because I cannot control queuing behavior in the commercial products to
which I have access. The Pentium-III laptop has an Ethernet interface and an
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(a) Normal operation of an Atheros NIC.
(b) Modified operation of an Atheros NIC.
Figure 3.3: Illustration of Atheros NIC operation. Events happen from left to
right.
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Figure 3.4: Network topology.
Atheros 802.11a/b/g card. I use MadWifi and configure the Atheros NIC to op-
erate in 802.11 master mode. I then use kernel-level bridging to bridge between
the 802.11 network interface card and the Ethernet network interface card. For
traffic generation, I use iperf; the traffic source generates traffic as an iperf client,
which was then sunk at iperf servers running on the normal user and the attacker.
I collect my data through an additional machine (not shown in Figure 3.4), which
captures all 802.11 frames sent on the network.
3.4.2 Evaluation
Maximum Throughput of Attacker
In order to determine the bit rate that an attacker needs to send to saturate the
channel, I first examine the maximum throughput of the attacker using 802.11b
when the attacker is the only user of the access point. I perform these measure-
ments and theoretical analysis using UDP because UDP is a non-conforming load
and will allow me to set my load regardless of the route’s capability to handle that
load. When Mallory forces Bob to transmit each packet n times, I compute the
amount of time required per packet as described in Section 3.3; I then translate
this into an application-layer rate and present it in Table 3.2.
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Table 3.2: Maximum UDP throughput of an attacker. n is the number of
transmissions required before the attacker sends an acknowledgment; this table
shows results in a theoretical analysis as described in Section 3.3 and an actual
outdoor/indoor experiment without/with any detectable 802.11 interference.
n Theoretical Outdoor Indoor
1 6814.9 (Kbps) 6049.0 (Kbps) 5782.0 (Kbps)
2 3184.2 (Kbps) N/A N/A
3 1866.4 (Kbps) 1563.0 (Kbps) 1282.0 (Kbps)
4 214.4 (Kbps) 209.1 (Kbps) 193.3 (Kbps)
5 162.3 (Kbps) 163.2 (Kbps) 159.4 (Kbps)
6 123.5 (Kbps) 128.8 (Kbps) 123.2 (Kbps)
7 99.7 (Kbps) 115.0 (Kbps) 114.0 (Kbps)
As described in Section 3.3, the rate adaptation mechanism at the access point
selects an 11 Mbps rate for users that acknowledge at least once every three trans-
missions and selects a 1 Mbps rate for users that acknowledge less frequently than
every three transmissions. This contributes to the sharp reduction in maximum
throughput between a user who acknowledges every three packets and a user who
acknowledges every four packets.
I then implemented the partial deafness attacker that requires one to seven
transmissions before it will send an acknowledgment. I could not consistently
require two transmissions because the driver I used to enable and disable ac-
knowledgments could not consistently set the register within the time between
the first and the second transmissions. I ran this attacker both in an outdoor
environment without measurable 802.11 interference and in an indoor environ-
ment where the 802.11 interference was uncontrolled. Some experimental results
are greater than the calculated theoretical values because the access point, in
violation of the specification, interleaves a beacon transmission between retrans-
missions of the original data packet. Because beacons are broadcast, and because
broadcast messages are always considered successful, they reset the contention
window size to minimum without resetting the retry count. Appendix A provides
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Table 3.3: UDP throughputs under partial deafness attack. Attacker’s source
rate is 200 Kbps. Results are averaged over 20 runs.
Normal user’s Normal user’s Attacker’s
source rate throughput throughput
100 (Kbps) 55.7 (Kbps) 112.0 (Kbps)
200 (Kbps) 111.8 (Kbps) 111.7 (Kbps)
400 (Kbps) 219.1 (Kbps) 109.3 (Kbps)
further details. My results show that a partial deafness attacker receiving about
115 Kbps of traffic can exhaust the entire forwarding capability of an access point.
Impact on the UDP Victim
I consider the impact on the throughput of a normal client that uses UDP against
a partial deafness attacker that only acknowledges the seventh transmission of
each packet. Theoretically, if the access point receives α packets destined to the
normal user for every packet destined to the attacker, then I would expect that
the normal user would get a α
1 + α
share of the overall throughput, since the access
point treats all packets equally.
To test this hypothesis, I gave the attacker a UDP source rate of 200 Kbps,
which is sufficient to saturate the access point’s wireless link under the partial
deafness attack, and gave the normal user a UDP source rate of 100, 200, then
400 Kbps. The resulting throughput is shown in Table 3.3. As expected, the ratio
of throughputs is equal to the ratio of the UDP source rates.
Impact on the TCP Victim
I now consider a normal TCP user competing for bandwidth against a partial
deafness attacker. The attacker again uses a UDP source rate of 200 Kbps. To
show the impact of the attack, I allow the TCP to warm up for a period of
time before the attack starts, then perform the attack for a period of time, and
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finally turn off the attack and allow the TCP to return to its steady-state behavior.
Because I am interested in how nodes share the available bandwidth on the wireless
link, I measure MAC-layer bandwidth usage, counting each retransmission as
additional channel usage. As shown previously, each transmission to the attacker
theoretically takes around 118 ms. I thus quantized each protocol’s usage into
500 ms slots so that the normal user has a chance to receive data in each slot, and
each slot conveys the granularity of MAC-layer usage. I plotted the MAC-layer
usage over time for each scenario. Because I allow a warm-up and cool-down
period where the attacker does not perform the partial deafness attack, each plot
includes a shaded box covering the 30-second time interval (from 0 to 30) during
which the attack took place.
Figure 3.5(a) shows the MAC-layer usage when a partial deafness attacker com-
petes against a normal user’s TCP flow when both clients use 802.11b. As shown
in Table 3.2, a UDP attacker only needs to transmit 115 Kbps in order to satu-
rate the link and cause congestion; allowing the attacker to send 200 Kbps traffic
would cause the attacker to experience a 43% loss rate without considering a shar-
ing normal user. When a normal TCP user shares the channel with the attacker,
the access point treats and drops an equal fraction of UDP and TCP packets;
hence, the TCP user would experience similar loss rate as the attacker. That is,
the normal TCP user would experience at least a 43% loss rate; since TCP is a
conforming transport layer protocol, such a high loss rate causes repeated TCP
time-outs and results in minimal throughput for the normal user, as shown in
Figure 3.5(a). I observe that the TCP has substantial variance in the MAC-layer
usage during recovery (Figure 3.5(a)); to show the cause of this large variance, I
plot two sample runs in Figure 3.6 and show that the TCP flow in each sample
run recovers at a substantially different time.
I examined the impact of a partial deafness attacker in the scenario where a
normal user connects to the access point using the 802.11g standard. The normal
user enjoys a faster connection when the attacker is silent; however, when the
attacker carries out the partial deafness attack, the transfer speed of the normal
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(a) Impact on 802.11b normal user.
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(b) Impact on 802.11g normal user.
Figure 3.5: MAC-layer utilization by the TCP under the partial deafness
attacker. The shaded region (0-30 sec) shows the time of attack; results are
averaged over 20 runs, with the error bars (95% confidence interval).
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Figure 3.6: The differences of TCP recovery time. The shaded region (0-30 sec)
shows the time of attack.
802.11g user is not significantly faster than that of a normal 802.11b user. This
result is consistent with my analysis of rate diversity in a 802.11b/g network at
the end of Section 3.3.
Partial deafness can even be carried out by an unauthenticated station when an
access point uses a captive portal to authenticate end points. To attack such an
access point, the attacker sends Internet control message protocol (ICMP) ping
messages to the captive portal. Figure 3.7 shows the impact on the data rate of a
normal user when an attacker performs a flood ping (using the ‘-f’ option) where
each ping packet contains 1470 bytes of data. My results shows that an attacker
can deny an access point’s service, even if the access point uses a captive portal
to authenticate users.
The partial deafness attack creates head-of-queue blocking by using retransmis-
sion and rate adaptation; thus, a normal user will experience an even higher loss
rate when other normal users are also present. This is intuitive since all users are
going to compete for the limited amount of remaining bandwidth. I performed my
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Figure 3.7: Partial deafness attack using ICMP ping. The shaded region (0-30
sec) shows the time of attack.
partial deafness attack in a network with two normal users, and show my results
in Figure 3.8.
I also performed an ns-2 simulation on the impact of the partial deafness at-
tack in a network with 1 to 10 normal users in addition to the attacker. In my
simulation, all users (normal and attacker) are located on a circle centered at the
access point with a radius of one meter. The normal users and the attacker are
given identical properties (such as signal and noise power levels), except that their
acknowledgment policy differs. That is, the attacker is identical to a normal user
except he does not acknowledge receiving a packet until the seventh transmission.
I present my simulation results in Figure 3.9. Figure 3.9(a) and Figure 3.9(b)
show the effectiveness of the partial deafness attack when the attacker uses the
UDP with source rate of 200 Kbps and the TCP, respectively. In both cases, I
can see that the goodput per normal user during attack is minuscule compared
to the fair goodput each normal user enjoys without the attack.
The partial deafness attack works by exploiting the retransmission mechanism
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Figure 3.8: Partial deafness attack on the network with two 802.11b normal
users. The shaded region (0-30 sec) shows the time of attack.
specified by 802.11 and rate adaptation implemented at an access point. I thus
examined the effectiveness of the partial deafness attack in the scenario where the
access point does not support rate diversity. Since a fast connection is impacted
by the slow connection (partially because of the slow connection’s transfer speed),
I expect the impact of the partial deafness attack to be alleviated when the access
point does not provide rate adaptation. I show my results in Figure 3.10.
I examined the effectiveness of the partial deafness attack on two other access
points that use different chipsets. Specifically, I examined a Linksys WRT54GC
and a Trendnet TEW-432BRP access point. I present my results in Figure 3.11. I
observe that both access points are also susceptible to the partial deafness attack.
Even though the rate adaptation mechanisms of these two access points differs
from that in the Linksys WRT54G, the partial deafness attack still makes the
attacker’s traffic use the base rate during the attack period. For the Linksys
WRT54GC, each packet is retransmitted only four times (I discuss this behavior
in Appendix A). The rate adaptation mechanism in Trendnet TEW-432BRP
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Figure 3.9: ns-2 simulation of the partial deafness attack on a network with
multiple 802.11b normal users; results are averaged over 20 runs, with the error
bars showing 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 3.10: Partial deafness attack on an access point with fixed rate, 11Mbps.
The shaded region (0-30 sec) shows the time of attack.
decreases the rate slowly as compared to the Linksys WRT54G. This difference
results in slower performance degradation, as shown in Figure 3.11(b).
3.5 Countermeasure
In this section, I propose a countermeasure that mitigates the partial deafness
attack. The partial deafness attack is based on head-of-queue blocking at the
access point that results in starvation of normal users. Thus my intuition for
mitigating the attack is to use time fairness to prevent starvation. Time fairness
has also been suggested in previous work [36] to increase throughput in a network
with rate diversity.
Time fairness can be enforced at the access point by implementing a time-based
regulator (TBR) that times each transmission; if user A is allocated time duration
tn in the n
th round, then each user is allocated the same time duration.
I implemented a TBR on HostAP as described in Section 3.4.1. In particular,
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(a) Linksys WRT54GC.
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(b) Trendnet TEW-432BRP.
Figure 3.11: MAC-layer utilization by TCP under the partial deafness attacker.
The shaded region (0-30 sec) shows the time of attack.
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Table 3.4: UDP throughput of normal user and partial deafness attacker with
time-based regulator (TBR). The source rate of attacker and normal user is
11 Mbps. Results are averaged over 20 runs.
Attacker Normal user
Normal user only 6.07 (Mbps)
Without TBR 110.9 (Kbps) 107.9 (Kbps)
With TBR 52.5 (Kbps) 2.93 (Mbps)
I implemented a priority queue at the access point that allows me to select the
next client to serve. I also emulated the rate adaptation of the Linksys WRT54G
access point in order to obtain consistent comparisons of the data rates between
my attack scenarios and my mitigation implementation.
I first consider the case where a normal UDP user shares the wireless link with
a partial deafness attacker. I gave both the partial deafness attacker and the
normal user a UDP source rate of 11 Mbps. The partial deafness attacker is
configured to only acknowledge the seventh transmission of every packet. The
resulting throughput is shown in Table 3.4. When there is no attacker, the user
can receive 6.07 Mbps of traffic, which is consistent with my previous results in
Table 3.2. Moreover, when the attacker is present, the user still enjoys almost
half of this rate, at 2.93 Mbps, which shows a significant improvement over using
access opportunity fairness.
I applied a TBR to a TCP user in the presence of a partial deafness attacker
who uses UDP at the transport layer. Figure 3.12(a) shows that a TBR allows
the user to obtain significantly better service when under attack. In particular,
the TCP user ceases to experience heavy packet losses when a TBR is deployed
at the access point.
I could also enforce time fairness in the MAC layer using two mechanisms in
the 802.11e amendment: service classes and transmission opportunity (TXOP).
Using TXOP for time fairness was also suggested by Siris and Stamatakis [37].
Because I only have two clients, I place each client in a separate service class
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with identical priorities (contention window, arbitrary interframe spacing (AIFS),
and TXOP). Each client then receives access opportunity fairness, and when one
receiver executes the partial deafness attack, the other receiver’s queues are ser-
viced without substantial impact. I also used TXOP to ensure time fairness on
the uplink ; without this mechanism, a TCP recipient contends for the channel in
order to send a single 40-byte acknowledgment packet, and when the recipient
does not obtain sufficient access to the channel, the user experiences suboptimal
performance because he can no longer acknowledge packets; the sender, in turn,
would stop sending data because no acknowledgments came back. The results
of using TXOP mechanisms to enforce time fairness is shown in Figure 3.12(b).
Again, I see dramatic improvement in the TCP traffic rate of the normal user.
Another possible mitigation strategy for the partial deafness attacker is to use
separate queues for each flow, and to allow the two flows to simultaneous con-
tend on the channel. I implemented this strategy using different service classes
with identical service priority. I set TXOP to zero, so each packet required a
separate round of channel contentions. The results of this strategy are shown in
Figure 3.13; these results show that station fairness is insufficient to protect TCP
traffic against the partial deafness attack.
As we have seen, time fairness can be implemented with 802.11e by choosing
appropriate traffic category for each node according to its fair share of channel
occupancy time. However, 802.11e itself (i.e. 802.11e without TBR) might not
be effective as a countermeasure since 802.11e specifies only four traffic categories
(i.e. four queues) decided by the type-of-service (ToS) field in the IP header [38].
In result, an attacker can assign respectively different ToS values to four traffics
and block all four queues used by 802.11e.
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Figure 3.12: The TCP user’s MAC-layer channel utilization with the
countermeasures. The shaded region (0-30 sec) shows the time of attack; results
are averaged over 20 runs and the error bar represents a 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 3.13: MAC-layer channel utilization by the TCP when TXOP is set to 0. The
shaded region (0-30 sec) shows the time of attack.
3.6 Discussion
3.6.1 Threat Model
In my threat model, I make the following assumptions:
First, the attackers exploit security flaws in wireless MAC protocols. The at-
tackers may or may not exploit vulnerability in other network layers, but such
attacks are orthogonal to their MAC layer attacks.
Second, authentication may be at a layer other than the MAC layer. An attacker
may target wireless public hotspots using a captive portal, such as those commonly
found at coffee shops, airports, and hotels. A captive portal is a router or a
gateway host that will not permit traffic to pass until a user has authenticated
himself [39]. In a captive portal setting, a client gets an IP address using DHCP
and any web request from the client is redirected to the captive portal. The
captive portal presents a web page and the user authenticates himself to the web
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page, possibly paying a fee. The partial deafness attacker can create traffic to
itself by sending the captive portal ICMP ping messages, as shown in Figure 3.7,
or other requests.
3.6.2 Specification and Implementation
The partial deafness attack exploits both retransmission and rate adaptation.
Retransmission is defined in the 802.11 standard, but rate adaptation is imple-
mentation dependent. Therefore, several rate adaptation mechanisms, such as
Auto Rate Fallback (ARF) [31] and SampleRate [32], have been suggested and
implemented in 802.11 products. Even though these mechanisms have been well
designed for fulfilling their stated purpose, they amplify the effect of the retrans-
mission caused by the partial deafness attack.
If an access point does retransmission but not rate adaptation, the impact of
partial deafness attack is alleviated, as shown in Figure 3.10. Also, if an access
point does not do retransmission but does perform rate adaptation, the partial
deafness attack can degrade other clients’ performance, not severely, but only by
an amount consistent with Heusse et al.’s observation [28].
A partial deafness attacker follows the 802.11 MAC rules except that it in-
tentionally fails to send timely acknowledgment. It is exploiting the fact that
it is difficult for the sender to know the receiver’s channel condition. Also, if
the attacker randomly changes the number of transmissions required before the
attacker sends an acknowledgment, as shown in Figure 3.14, the attack is still
effective against a normal user, but the detection of such an attack might be
difficult.
3.7 Summary
In this chapter, I presented a denial-of-service attack, called partial deafness,
against current IEEE 802.11 wireless networks. My attack targets the 802.11
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Figure 3.14: Partial deafness attacker randomly chooses the number of
transmissions required before the attacker sends an acknowledgment from a
uniform distribution on the set {1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}. The shaded region (0-30 sec)
shows the time of attack; results are averaged over 20 runs, with the error bars
(95% confidence interval).
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MAC protocol without needing to modify the MAC-layer implementation. Fur-
thermore, my attack does not require the attacker to have better resources than
a normal user; the attacker can have lower signal strength, slower computation,
and be farther from the base station and still negatively impact the normal users.
I showed that my attack substantially degrades the performance of normal users
that use UDP and can almost completely deny service to users using TCP.
I then proposed and evaluated countermeasures based on time fairness that
mitigate the partial deafness attack. At the MAC layer, I used 802.11e quality-of-
service amendment mechanisms, namely service classes and transmission oppor-
tunity, to achieve time fairness while avoiding any adverse effects on the self-clock
property of TCP. At the network layer, I use time-based regulation to ensure that
each client gets an equal fraction of the service provided by the access point. I
experimentally showed that both of these mechanisms restore a reasonable level of
performance for normal users, whether they use UDP or TCP, when an attacker
performs the partial deafness attack.
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CHAPTER 4
SECURE MAC-LAYER PROTOCOL FOR
CAPTIVE PORTALS IN WIRELESS
HOTSPOTS
IEEE 802.11 wireless networks are widely deployed today for governmental, com-
mercial, and personal uses. As the demand for wireless communication increases,
securing wireless systems against malicious behavior has taken on increasing im-
portance. Previous protocols have been designed to use a shared key or an authen-
tication server to provide link confidentiality, including wired equivalent privacy
(WEP) [2], Wi-Fi protected access (WPA) [4], and IEEE 802.11i (also called
WPA2) [24]. Though WPA and WPA2 are quite robust in environments where
the base station and client can share a key, such as home, small business, and
enterprise settings, they cannot provide the same properties in open hotspot envi-
ronments because of the lack of a properly shared secret key. In particular, in an
open and public environment, such as coffee shops, bookstores, and restaurants, a
single pre-shared key may be known by an attacker; therefore, individual shared
secrets are difficult to distribute in a small and public environment.
Some hotspots are owned or administered by a service provider such as AT&T
that also owns and administers many other access points. In these environments,
a subscriber to that service provider may be able to use WPA2-Enterprise to gain
secure access. However, users that do not subscribe to that service provider do not
have a shared key with that provider. Furthermore, unlike in cellular systems, the
various service providers do not have a common roaming mechanism [40]. Thus
a user that connects to an access point but subscribes to a service other than a
locally administrating service cannot establish a secure MAC layer connection to
that access point. A final problem with trying to deploy WPA2-Enterprise in a
hotspot environment is that ease of use and configuration is key to a successful
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deployment [41]. In general, due to the convenience of users, the large number
of Wi-Fi service providers, and the inherent need for open access, existing solu-
tions to MAC-layer security in Wi-Fi are not applicable to many deployments of
commercial hotspot service.
Due to the lack of applicable MAC-layer security solutions, current 802.11-
based hotspots choose one of two security strategies. The first strategy is to use
no security whatsoever, so that any user can connect directly to the Internet.
Small coffee shops often use this strategy, sometimes in combination with a single
WEP key that is distributed to all of the customers of that coffee shop. The second
strategy is to use a captive portal. A captive portal is a router or a gateway host
that will not allow traffic to pass until a user has authenticated himself [39]. In
a captive portal environment, a client device acquires an Internet protocol (IP)
address using dynamic host configuration protocol (DHCP) and any web request
from the client device is redirected to the captive portal. The captive portal
presents a web page, the user authenticates himself to the web page, possibly
paying an access fee, and the portal stops redirecting that client’s traffic, so the
client can now access the rest of the Internet.
In this chapter, I study the security of public wireless hotspots that use captive
portals. My techniques are also applicable to other environments, but in this
chapter, I focus on their use in captive portal environments. I aim to address the
problem that captive portals encrypt only the authentication phase, where the
user supplies login credentials or other payment data, and transmits user data in
the clear [39]. As a result, many service providers recommend that their users
use a virtual private network (VPN) to secure their traffic, and some previous
research attempts to use VPNs to develop a secure public hotspot service [42].
However, not all user have access to VPN. In addition, these approaches attempt
to solve a MAC-layer problem at the network layer, and are fundamentally unable
to address attacks at the MAC layer [39].
Future access points may incorporate additional application-layer services, and
using such services may require a direct connection to the access point. In such
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environments, securing the data link between the access point and client gains
increasing importance. For example, smart caching in access points (SCAP) [43]
uses the access point to duplicate, detect, and cache content for a point-to-point
(P2P) streaming/data distribution service. SCAP uses its cached packets to sig-
nificantly reduce the uploading traffic in wireless networks. Another example is
the nano data center (NaDa) [44], a new distributed computing platform that
uses Internet service provider (ISP)-controlled home gateways to provide a dis-
tributed datacenter infrastructure. Though NaDa is targeted at home gateways,
companies like Fonera provide a mechanism for home gateways to share their
connections through a captive portal.
One important property for MAC-layer security mechanisms is that they must
be resilient to attacker collusion. In a collusion attack, attackers share information
in an attempt to break the security of a victim node. In a commodity wireless sys-
tem, an attacker can easily purchase a large number of wireless network interfaces
and access points, increasing the importance of collusion-resistant protocols.
I design a protocol that allows a client to establish a secure connection with
an access point in the presence of malicious entities. When a client connects to
an access point, my protocol provides a secure authentication and key exchange
process. My scheme constructs a protocol for establishing a secure connection on
top of hierarchical identity-based cryptography [45]. My scheme is scalable, easy
to deploy, provides secure authentication of both the client user and the access
point, and is resistant to attacker collusion.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows; in Section 4.1 I review some
related work. In Section 4.2 I overview the hierarchical identity-based cryptog-
raphy on which the key distribution of my proposed protocol based. I detail the
proposed scheme in Section 4.3 and analyze security of the proposed scheme in
Section 4.4. Finally, I summarize this chapter in Section 4.5.
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4.1 Related Work
The IEEE 802.11 standard [2] is widely deployed because of its convenience and
low cost. Wireless network interfaces implementing the standard operate in the
unlicensed spectrum and, as such, are not subject to licensing fees; the interfaces
are built for the mass market and thus easy to set up and use; and due to economies
of scale, these network interface devices tend to be inexpensive.
The widespread deployment of 802.11, together with the relative ease of gaining
access to an 802.11 network, has attracted attention to security concerns. The
original IEEE 802.11 standard defined the wired equivalent privacy (WEP) secu-
rity protocol. The design goal of WEP is to provide the same level of security as a
wired network. Fluhrer et al. showed that RC4, the encryption algorithm used by
WEP, can be broken, compromising the session key [21]. Further attacks against
WEP exploited both the encryption mechanism [22, 23] and the authentication
scheme [19].
Subsequent protocols, such as Wi-Fi protected access (WPA) [4] and IEEE
802.11i (also called WPA2) [24], have been proposed to address the exploitable
vulnerabilities of WEP. As described in the introduction of this chapter, WPA and
WPA2 are not well-suited to the hotspot environment because of the difficulty of
having pre-arranged authentication information or a secret pre-shared key. In
particular, establishing such accounts or keys requires additional effort on the
part of subscribers, which conflicts with the provider’s business goal of increasing
subscriptions [41]. To make the setup more convenient, the Wi-Fi protected setup
scheme provides three different setup methods: the push-button method, the PIN
method, and an out-of-band channel [46]. Table 4.1 shows how Wi-Fi protected
setup makes the configuration procedure more user-friendly. Though Wi-Fi pro-
tected setup can simplify setup in a home or small office environment, it does not
solve the problem in wireless hotspots, because it is infeasible for a user to gain
physical access to the access point, as needed for all three Wi-Fi protected setup
options.
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Table 4.1: Comparison of the setup procedures: WPA, Wi-FI protected setup:
PIN method and Wi-FI protected setup: push-button method. Here the
registrar is the network enrollment center.
Step WPA PIN Push-button
1 Turn on Access Point (AP) Turn on AP/registrar Turn on AP
2 Access AP Turn on client device Turn on client device
3 Set network name Access registrar Push button on AP
4 Activate security Enter PIN Push button on client device
5 Set pre-shared key
6 Turn on client device
7 Select network name
8 Enter pre-shared key
Because of the challenges of using WPA and WPA2 in hotspot environments,
typical hotspot deployments use a captive portal. Captive portals use a se-
cure sockets layer (SSL) to encrypt authentication and payment data, but af-
terwards passively route cleartext traffic to and from destination sites [39]. Previ-
ous work on securing data through a captive portal focuses on network-layer ap-
proaches [47,48]. However, many security vulnerabilities that exist at the medium
access control (MAC) layer, such as MAC address spoofing, are fundamentally un-
solvable at a higher layer. As a result, I address the MAC-layer security issues in
a captive portal environment.
Yang et al. proposed the method of providing the secure connection on the
MAC-layer in wireless hotspot [49]. The suggested solution, dummy authentica-
tion key establishment, is based on WPA-pre-shared Key (PSK). Here dummy
means that the user does not exactly authenticate. The proposed protocol pro-
vides link-layer data encryption in wireless hotspots and separate session encryp-
tion keys for different users.
Hole196 [50], a vulnerability in the WPA2, was recently reported. It is an insider
attack which can be carried out by the attacker. The WPA2 defines two types
of keys for data encryption: pairwise transient key (PTK) and group temporal
key (GTK). While PTK is used to encrypt unicast data frames (e.g. user data),
GTK is for the encryption of group addressed data frames (e.g. ARP request).
Here, only an access point is supposed to transmit group addressed data traffic
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encrypted using the GTK, and clients are supposed to decrypt that traffic using
the GTK. However, an attacker can inject spoofed GTK-encrypted packets. An
attacker might exploit this weakness in three ways: for ARP poisoning and a
man-in-the-middle attack, for injecting malicious code, and for a denial-of-service
(DoS) attack.
The dummy authentication key establishment is also exposed to the Hole196
vulnerability. The Hole196 vulnerability in a WPA2 network with the dummy au-
thentication key establishment is expected to be more severe because the attacker
can easily be an insider without authentication. Also, the dummy authentication
key establishment is unclear how to handle revocation. My proposed scheme is
not exposed to the Hole196 vulnerability and is able to handle revocation.
Another attack against wireless hotspots targets the client device. Because
the client device and access point lack a shared key, the client device cannot
authenticate the access point. Figure 4.1 shows an attacker that makes a rogue
access point that pretends to be a normal access point. In this example, when a
client device attempts to join the network AIRPORT, the client device connects
to the access point that has the strongest signal among all access points beaconing
the same service set identifier (SSID). After the client device connects to the rogue
access point, the attacker can conduct a phishing attack in an attempt to obtain
a user’s login credentials or payment information [40]. The rogue access point
attack is effective in its ability to intercept all user traffic and is also difficult to
detect.
Recent research efforts have aimed to detect rogue access points by sensing radio
frequency (RF) [51, 52] and measuring transmission control protocol (TCP) and
Internet protocol (IP) traffic characteristics, e.g. inter-packet spacing [53,54] and
round-trip time [55, 56]. These approaches are primarily of interest in enterprise
environments where full-time network administrators can monitor for on-site rogue
access points; in remote hotspot environments, these approaches may carry too
much overhead to be conducted or understood by a normal hotspot user. In my
scheme, a normal user can easily detect a rogue access point.
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Figure 4.1: Rogue access point attack.
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4.2 Key Distribution Using Hierarchical Identity-Based
Cryptography
As I have mentioned previously, a commercial Wi-Fi hotspot is open for public
access, and such environments are not conducive for sharing login credentials or
secret key information between the client and the access point. In my scheme, I
establish keys between an unproven user and an access point using identity-based
cryptography (first proposed by Shamir [57]). Before I describe my key distri-
bution scheme in Section 4.2.2, Section 4.2.1 overviews the hierarchical identity-
based cryptography on which I build.
4.2.1 Overview of Hierarchical Identity-Based Cryptography
In this section, I review the hierarchical identity-based cryptography proposed
by Gentry and Silverberg [45]. Gentry and Silverberg’s approach assumes the
difficulty of bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem and treats each cryptographic hash
function as a random oracle. They then generate a user’s private key in a hi-
erarchical manner, so that the root private key generator (PKG) can delegate
a subspace of its private key generating capabilities to lower-level PKGs, which
can in turn delegate further subspaces. The PKG at any level can only generate
private keys for elements of its delegated space, and can further delegate only
to lower-level PKGs. Although the lower-layer PKGs generate private keys for
end-users, only the root PKG’s public parameters are needed to verify a user’s
public key. Once keys have been disseminated using the technique proposed by
Gentry and Silverberg, they also provide an encryption and signature scheme that
provides chosen ciphertext security.
4.2.2 Application to My Scheme
I build my scheme on hierarchical identity-based cryptography. Because of its
uniqueness, uniformity, and usefulness for identification, I use the IEEE medium
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access control (MAC) address as the user’s public key. IEEE MAC address consists
of a 24-bit organizationally unique identifier (OUI) [58], which is assigned by
the IEEE and corresponds to the manufacturer of a network device, and a 24-
bit network interface controller (NIC) specific portion, which the manufacturer
assigns to the device and is unique across all devices sharing the same OUI.
Given a public key, that is, a MAC address, I construct the corresponding pri-
vate key using the key distribution scheme described in Section 4.2.1. Using hier-
archical identity-based cryptography [45], the PKG generates each user’s private
key using the user’s MAC addresses and the security parameters provided by the
root PKG. For example, with an IEEE MAC address, the root PKG would be the
IEEE, while the manufacturer to which IEEE assigns OUI would be the second-
level PKG. Each manufacturer would then assign private keys to each device when
it is manufactured. Though I could use single-level identity-based cryptography
and have the IEEE directly provide the keys for each manufactured device, my
preferred approach uses hierarchical PKGs in order to delegate the workload of
generating private keys to each manufacturer. Once a network interface device
has a private key, it can use that key for authentication and to establish a secure
connection, as described in Section 4.3.
I now show that my usage of hierarchical identity-based cryptography [45] is
compatible with its design assumptions. The MAC address is an ideal public
key, because it is both uniquely assigned and in widespread use. Also, my use
of Gentry and Silverberg’s scheme ensures that each user’s secret key is private,
and collusion between multiple network interface devices, even from the same
manufacturer, does not provide any advantage over another user’s private key.
Thus, in my work, malicious users cannot learn the private key of other users who
attempt to access the Internet at a Wi-Fi hotspot, even under a collusion attack.
Furthermore, a MAC address spoofing attacker [39] cannot compromise the private
key, and therefore cannot sign messages for the victim, because the identity-based
cryptography I have chosen is chosen plaintext attack (CPA) secure. (Gentry and
Silverberg also provide a scheme secure against chosen ciphertext attack (CCA).)
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As in other standards (e.g. 802.16e mobile WiMAX [1]), my scheme requires
factory installation of a cryptographic key. In current wireless networks, my
scheme might be added as a new 802.11 amendment or new wireless network
standard.
4.3 Protocol Definition
In this section, I present my protocol for a client device and an access point in
a captive portal environment. I use the scheme in Section 4.2.2, in which the
manufacturer of each wireless network interface assigns it a unique IEEE medium
access control (MAC) address as its public key, and the manufacturer uses its
private key generator (PKG) functionality to provide the network interface with
a private key corresponding to its MAC address. My protocol uses this public
key to securely exchange a private key, which in turn is used to establish a secure
connection between an access point and a client device. My scheme protects
against MAC address spoofing, rogue access points, and certain MAC-layer denial-
of-service (DoS) attacks.
My proposed protocol consists of up to eight messages (notation in Table 4.2) :
(1) C → A : eC
(2) A→ C : eA, SA[eA, eC , tA], IDA
(3) C → CA : Inquiry to verify eA (optional)
(4) CA→ C : Response (optional)
(5) C → A : eC , {{SA[eA, eC , tA], kA,C}dC}eA
(6) A→ C : Client puzzle (optional)
(7) C → A : Puzzle solution (optional)
(8) A→ C : Virtual AP’s SSID
The client sends a request with its medium access control (MAC) address to
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Table 4.2: Notation.
A Access point
C Client device
dX X’s private key
eX X’s MAC address (public key)
IDX X’s certificate signed by a CA
kA,C Shared key between A and C
{M}k Message M enciphered with key k
SA[M ] Digital signature of M with A’s private key
tX Time stamp from X’s local clock
the access point in (1). In (2), the access point uses its secure sockets layer (SSL)
certificate to sign its MAC address, which establishes the authenticity of the access
point, eC , and time stamp tA. To use this authentication feature, an access point
must have an SSL certificate signed by a certificate authority (CA) trusted by the
user. In addition, I assume that the access point has a private key corresponding
to its IEEE MAC address. To prove that the access point belongs to a certain
domain (e.g. t-mobile.com), the access point signs its MAC address with its SSL
private key, and then sends the signed message (SA[eA, eC , tA]) with the certificate
(IDA) to the client C.
In (3) and (4), the client inquires optionally the validity of eA to check ac-
curately whether eA has been revoked. I leave the details of this check to the
implementation.
In (5), the client device sends the received signed message (SA[eA, eC , tA]) to-
gether with a shared key chosen by the client kA,C to the access point. In order to
verify that this message is sent by C, the message is encrypted using C’s private
key. In addition, to ensure that the access point is legitimately using address
eA, the entire message is encrypted using A’s MAC address, so that only A can
obtain kA,C . The shared key (kA,C) can then be used as a shared secret key, for
example as an WPA2 AES (advanced encryption standard) key. The AP verifies
68
the received message by checking that the MAC address of the received message
matches the one in the SA[eA, eC , tA] and the current local time is within the
validity period from timestamp tA.
When all checks have passed, the access point can immediately provision re-
sources that allow the client to establish a secure connection to the access point.
Messages (6) and (7) allow the access point to send a puzzle to the client and
receive a solution in response. These messages should be encrypted using the key
kA,C to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. My protocol is not sensitive to the
type of challenge used; one challenge that can be used with my scheme is that of
Juels and Brainard [59].
After the access point has received a puzzle solution, it creates a virtual access
point. A virtual access point is a logical entity that exists within one access
point [60]. Each virtual access point can have a distinct service set identifier
(SSID) and security parameters (such as a WPA2 key). A single access point can
support multiple virtual access points; a typical access point can support 64 or 128
virtual access points. The access point randomly generates an SSID specifically
for this client and creates a virtual access point with the chosen SSID and shared
key kA,C . The access point then notifies the client of the SSID of the new access
point in the final message of my protocol.
4.4 Security Analysis
My scheme does not depend on the WPA pre-shared key mode, and provides
better security (especially against Hole196 vulnerability described in Section 3.2),
in the sense that each client connects to a unique virtual access point. Also, my
scheme is not restricted by the security problem of WPA-PSK and RC4 that WPA
still relies on. Moreover, my scheme can protect against MAC address spoofing,
rogue access points, and certain MAC-layer denial-of-service (DoS) attacks.
Even if an attacker spoofs the MAC address of an access point or a client device
or relays one of the protocol messages, it does not learn the shared key (kA,C) in
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message (5) because it does not know the private key of the access point (dA).
Consequently, the attacker can neither eavesdrop on nor modify messages that
are transmitted within a secure connection established using my scheme.
To detect a rogue access point, after receiving message (2), client C can check
the authenticity of access point A by first ensuring that IDA is a valid certificate
signed by a CA that the client trusts, can check that the certificate matches the
access point’s SSID, and then can verify the signature SA[eA, eC , tA]. Also, for
preventing replay attack, the client can check whether eC matches with its own
MAC address and also checks tA. If each of these checks is successful, then the
client can trust that the MAC address given (eA) is associated with the access
point to which the client wishes to connect. (This approach is similar to that used
by hypertext transfer protocol secure (HTTPS).) Moreover, through messages (3)
and (4), the client can verify whether the access point to which it is connected is
in fact legitimately using that MAC address.
The access point may have limited resources, and an DoS attacker that has
obtained a number of wireless network interfaces could use them to take up all
the resources of an access point, preventing legitimate users from connecting. If
the challenge in (6) and (7) is of sufficient difficulty, an attacker cannot obtain all
of a base station’s secure connection resources.
4.5 Summary
In hotspot environments or other scenarios where the distribution of authenti-
cation credentials and pre-shared information is difficult, my scheme establishes
a secure connection in the presence of malicious entities. Two communication
parties agree on a shared, secret key using the public key-private key pair gener-
ated based on hierarchical identity-based cryptography. Focusing on applications
in public wireless hotspots, I studied the security vulnerabilities, especially at
the medium access control (MAC) layer, of captive portals, which are currently
used in hotspots. Using the already available MAC address as the public key,
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my scheme is not only practical, i.e. easy to deploy and scalable, but also pro-
tects users’ integrity and confidentiality against colluding attackers. In particular,
I defend against the attacks of MAC address spoofing, rogue access point, and
denial-of-service attack. The integration of my scheme within 802.11i [24] is left
as future work.
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CHAPTER 5
WIMAX FUZZING ON A PROTOCOL
CONFORMANCE TESTER
Most efforts in standards organizations and academic research on wireless medium
access control (MAC) security focus on the requirements of confidentiality and
authentication, which are more important in wireless networks because of the
lack of physical access control that normally exists in wired networks. These
approaches often ignore two other threats to security: attacks against availability,
which can prevent a user from communicating at all, and incorrect implementation
of MAC-layer and driver routines, which can have consequences ranging from
dropped packets to complete host compromise.
Unexpected or out-of-specification behavior in any system presents a security
vulnerability. A system’s security is often only as strong as its weakest com-
ponent, so a single point of incorrect behavior can result in the compromise of
an entire system. Traditionally, an attacker that discovers incorrect behavior will
perform reverse engineering to determine the cause of that incorrect behavior, and
determine whether that bug represents an attack path interesting to the attacker.
Whether a particular attack vector is interesting to an attacker depends on several
factors, including the difficulty of implementing an attack, the probability that
the attack will be detected, the consequence of being detected, the value of the
target being attacked, and the availability of other attack vectors.
In the reverse engineering step, the attacker employs a debugger to analyze the
code that is misbehaving. Because the attacker often does not have the source
code to the vulnerable system, the debugging is performed in assembly language.
When the vulnerable system is a user-level application, such as a web server, the
attacker would use a user-level debugger, but when the vulnerable system is inside
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the kernel, such as a network stack bug, the attacker must use a kernel debugger.
Drivers present an even more challenging debugging environment, because drivers
may have real-time requirements. Finally, if the bug is in the firmware of a
device, the challenge is even more formidable, because the attacker may lack even
rudimentary documentation about the instruction set architecture (ISA) of the
device’s microprocessor.
Once an attacker has determined that a point of incorrect behavior represents
an interesting attack vector, the attacker will engineer input that is specifically
designed to crash or compromise the victim host. The most common form of ex-
ploit, known as “stack smashing,” works against code that incorrectly terminates
its copying from user input into a stack variable. In order to support recursion,
many modern languages allocate a function’s local variables on a stack, so that
each recursive invocation of a function has its own allocation of local variables. By
convention, the stack “grows up,” meaning that more recent stack frames have
smaller addresses than calling stack frames. This means that when a program
writes beyond the end of a variable in the stack, it can affect the other variables
in that function, and in other functions. The attacker then causes this code to
be executed by overwriting the saved return address (to which this function will
return). When the function jumps to the return address, it will jump to a value
chosen by the attacker, typically either a string of exploit code that is inserted by
the attack or the address of a function in libc, such as system, that executes the
next step of the attack.
Recently, a technique called fuzzing has been developed to automate the detec-
tion of unusual behavior [61]. In particular, in fuzzing, a system evaluator sends a
variety of invalid inputs to the system under test and observes the behavior of the
system. If the system crashes or displays other unusual behavior, the evaluator ap-
plies the traditional methods described above to determine whether that unusual
behavior represents an interesting exploit. Though fuzzing was initially aimed at
user-mode programs, it has since been extended to protocol implementations.
In this chapter, I evaluate several WiMAX implementations using fuzzing based
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on the WiMAX protocol conformance testers and other tools as appropriate (in
particular, a software radio). The process of fuzzing a network protocol differs
somewhat in several ways. First, it requires the use of specialized tools that are ca-
pable of generating incorrect traffic. Unlike traditional fuzzing, which can be built
on a user-mode program that generates raw IP packets, fuzzing for lower-layer
protocols requires the ability to generate non-compliant MAC-layer messages, the
interfaces for which are typically not documented in commodity hardware. Sec-
ondly, the determination of whether or not behavior is correct is also often more
complicated, because it requires access to the messages sent in response, which
again is not typically available in the firmware.
5.1 Assessment of MAC Security Implementations
IEEE 802.16e [1], the standard for Mobile WiMAX, outlines security mechanisms
for mobile network. The security sublayer of MAC protocol in Figure 5.1 includes:
• Authenticating network users: Authentication establishes the genuine iden-
tity of a device or user wishing to join a wireless network. In IEEE 802.16e,
authentication uses a public key interchange protocol, which ensures not
only authentication, but also the secure establishment of encryption keys.
IEEE 802.16e standard defines privacy key management (PKM) protocol in
security sublayer, which allows three types of authentication:
– Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) based authentication: RSA based au-
thentication applies X.509 digital certificates together with RSA en-
cryption. In this authentication mode, a base station authenticates
the mobile station through its unique X.509 digital certificate that has
been issued by the mobile station manufacturer. The X.509 certifi-
cate contains the mobile station’s public key and its MAC address.
When requesting an authorization key, the mobile station sends its
digital certificate to the base station, and then base station validates
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the certificate, uses the verified public key to encrypt an authorization
key and sends back to the mobile station. All mobile stations that
use RSA authentication have factory installed private/public key pairs
together with factory installed X.509 certificates.
– EAP (extensible authentication protocol) based authentication: In the
case of EAP based authentication, the mobile station is authenticated
either by virtue of a unique operator issued credential, such as a SIM
or an X.509 certificate as described above. Authentication method is
determined by the operator’s choice of type of EAP: EAP-AKA (au-
thentication and key Agreement), EAP-TLS (transport layer security),
EAP-TTLS (tunneled transport layer security).
– RSA based authentication followed by EAP authentication
• Authorize the user, if the network service provider provisions the user: In
IEEE 802.16e, the mobile station requests an authorization key as well as a
security association identity (SAID) to authorize the user credentials. The
authorization request contains mobile station’s X.509 certificate, encryption
algorithms and cryptographic ID. In response, the base station carries out
the necessary validation and sends back an authorization reply, which in-
cludes the authorization key encrypted with the mobile station’s public key,
a lifetime key and a SAID.
• Encrypt the key transfer and data traffic: Data traffic is encrypted by traffic
encryption key (TEK), which is a random number generated by the base
station using the TEK encryption algorithm. The key encryption key (KEK)
is used to encrypt the TEK when it is sent to the mobile station. The KEK
is 128 bits long and is derived directly from the 160 bits long authorization
key.
The protocols that are used in WiMAX for authentication and encryption are
based on well-known and scrutinized standards for data security, both in their
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Figure 5.1: Security sublayer.
cryptographic primitives and in their protocol development. Techniques such as
the KEK and TEK are best practices in security protocol development. However,
academic research has analyzed these protocols and found some vulnerabilities:
a disclosure of security context during the initial network entry and lack of sup-
port for integrity protection of management frames. One such vulnerability is the
exposure of security context during initial network entry [62]. Many physical pa-
rameters, performance factors, and security contexts between mobile station and
base station are determined during the initial network entry. However, this infor-
mation, such as the SS basic capability (SBC) negotiation parameters and PKM
security contexts, are not subject to any confidentiality measures, and can hence
be disclosed to malicious users. Another vulnerability is the lack of support for in-
tegrity protection of management frames [63]. Some MAC management messages
are sent without authentication. Examples of these messages sent by the mo-
bile station are: RNG-REQ (ranging request), REG-REQ (registration request),
SBC-REQ (mobile station basic capability request), DSA-REQ (dynamic service
addition request), DSD-REQ (dynamic service deletion request), REP-RSP (chan-
nel measurement report response), DREG-REQ (deregistration request). These
MAC management messages create a potential risk of DoS attacks and MITM
attack, since these are never encrypted and not always authenticated.
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Beside known MAC-layer vulnerabilities, all MAC-layer implementations (such
as in device firmware and drivers) potentially have security flaws. Specifically,
because the firmware and device driver process each MAC-layer message, any se-
curity flaw in the firmware or device driver could result in the compromise of the
base stations or clients. An attacker can intentionally emit nonstandard packets
to exploit MAC-layer vulnerabilities. A malformed packet can cause a crash in the
code that processes the packet. This code could be either in the device firmware
or in the device driver (or even in the user-mode program that interfaces with
the device). These crashes may also be exploitable, particularly inside the device
driver, which usually runs with kernel privileges and interfaces with various ker-
nel functions. Previous fuzzing research on other protocols (e.g. 802.11 [64, 65],
short message service on cellphone [66], GSM [67]) all demonstrate weaknesses
that arise from memory corruption during the decoding of malformed protocol
messages. These memory corruption attacks do not attack protocol specification
vulnerabilities; rather, they attack implementation flaws in those protocol spec-
ifications. For example, certain protocol fields may be copied into fixed-length
buffers; when those fields are longer than the specification allows, this copy re-
sults in a buffer overflow, which presents a remote code-execution vulnerability.
The methods to discover these security flaws in certain network protocol imple-
mentations can be divided into two circumstances:
• If we have source code of the network protocol, we can find a vulnerability
through code analysis. Kothari et al. show that code analysis is able to
find all known attacks for TCP, ECN (explicit congestion notification) and
SCTP [68].
• If we do not have the protocol source code, we may discover possible attacks
by binary analysis tools such as BitBlaze [69].
However, in case of WiMAX MAC protocol, the MAC protocol is implemented
in firmware.
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5.2 Fuzzing Engine Framework Considerations and Design
5.2.1 Fuzzing Generally
Fuzzing is a software testing technique aimed at detecting security vulnerabilities
in implementation bugs [61]. In the fuzzing approach, incorrect (or random)
inputs are provided to the system under test. Fuzzing is known to be very effective
in finding several kinds vulnerabilities [64], especially when the source code of
the system under test is not available, or when it is desirable to test several
implementations of the same external specification. Fuzzing is most powerful
when used to detect simple bugs, such as those triggered by a small number
of invalid inputs, rather than complex bugs that require extensive context. In
addition, fuzzing is most efficient when combined with best practices in fuzzing.
For example, rather than testing all possible lengths of input, limiting the search
to specific values is efficient (as described in Section 5.4.1) because such values
tend to cover the range of common bugs.
Fuzzing involves making tools that generate semivalid data, send it the system
under test, and determine whether the implementation fails [61]. The design of a
fuzzing framework includes the following considerations:
• Coverage: Because one advantage of fuzzing is its ability to be deployed in
an automated environment, ensuring that the system under test experiences
many different attack vectors is an important consideration. For example, a
fuzzer that only considers a few protocol messages does not provide strong
coverage.
• Complexity : Some attacks may only be available under certain environ-
ments. For example, a client device may only be able to attack a base
station when another client device is present. More complex attacks involve
not only the fuzzing engine (as it generates fuzzed messages), but also the
environment under test.
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• Speed : A counterpoint to the considerations of coverage and complexity,
speed evaluates the speed at which the fuzzer can evaluate the system under
test. Because coverage and complexity exponentially increase the number
of scenarios to be tested, speed (and in particular automation) is an impor-
tant consideration for the fuzzing engine. Therefore, fuzzing uses grammars
or protocol specs to generate the well-formed inputs. Also, for testing pro-
grams, fuzzing can be combined with dynamic test generation to increase
coverage and speed [70].
5.2.2 MAC Protocol Fuzzing
The process of fuzzing a MAC protocol differs somewhat from that of traditional
fuzzing aiming at user-mode programs in several ways. First, it requires the
use of specialized tools that are capable of generating incorrect traffic. Fuzzing a
MAC protocol requires the ability to generate non-compliant MAC-layer messages,
the interfaces for which are typically not documented in commodity hardware.
Secondly, the determination of whether or not behavior is correct is also often
more complicated, because it requires access to the messages sent in response,
which again is not typically available above the firmware.
The barrier of fuzzing a MAC protocol is the generation of incorrect traffic. I
distinguish generated incorrect traffic into stateless fuzzing and stateful fuzzing.
A stateless fuzzing tool generates packets that are considered as responses to a
message or request from a wireless device. In other words, regardless of the MAC
protocol state, stateless fuzzed packets are sent to the system under test.
Unlike the stateless fuzzing tool, the stateful fuzzing tool can recognize the
MAC protocol state and send appropriate packets with invalid data. Also, in
stateful fuzzing, the results of the fuzzing can be determined more precisely when
analyzing the response packets as well. Therefore, stateful fuzzing is much harder
to implement, but it can better test the code paths.
With suitable fuzzing tools, MAC protocol fuzzing searches for weaknesses that
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arise from memory corruption during the decoding of malformed protocol mes-
sages. These memory corruption attacks do not attack protocol specification
vulnerabilities; rather, they attack implementation flaws in those protocol spec-
ifications. For example, certain protocol fields may be copied into fixed-length
buffers; when those fields are longer than the specification allows, this copy re-
sults in a buffer overflow, which presents a remote code-execution vulnerability.
I must also consider the platform on which I build my fuzzing engine. An ideal
fuzzer might be a base station/mobile station on which I can modify the protocol
stack to generate fuzzed packets. However, hardware limitations prevent me from
implementing a fuzzer in base station/mobile station (generally due to the lack of
a WiMAX hardware for which I am able to modify the protocol stack). Therefore,
the design of my fuzzing tools is based on the equipment that I use. I further
describe these tools, and the fuzzing engine design considerations, below.
5.2.3 Previous Approaches
Previous research on other MAC protocols made fuzzing tools using packet injec-
tion or open source codes.
Fuzzing by Packet Injection
Mendonca and Neves [64] and Butti [65] demonstrated the effectiveness of fuzzing
802.11 wireless devices. Their work concentrated on stateless fuzzing by injecting
large numbers of malformed packets. In Butti’s approach, a fuzzer is in 802.11
monitor mode and any arbitrary 802.11 frame can be injected into a fuzzer. A
fuzzer then broadcasts the injected packets. Mendonca’s approach is also similar.
Through fuzzing by packet injection, Mendonca and Neves [64] and Butti [65]
found the vulnerabilities of many commercial products, especially 802.11 wireless
LAN card drivers. However, as Butti identified in [65], this approach has two
major drawbacks. First, a fuzzer must answer very fast because the normal client
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device performs channel hopping. Second, a fuzzer cannot be sure if the frame
was analyzed or not by the driver. This may induce false negatives.
Fuzzing by packet injection may be harder than fuzzing using open source
code drivers described in the next subsection, because a tester must find a set of
drivers and tools that support the injection of arbitrary packets. As described in
the previous paragraph, a strict process must be followed to avoid false negatives.
Finally, fuzzing by this type of packet injection is limited to stateless fuzzing.
Fuzzing Using Open Source Code Drivers
Another line of previous research on other wireless MAC protocols made fuzzing
tools using open source code drivers. Keil and Kolbitsch [71] used MadWifi driver,
which is a Linux kernel device driver for Atheros-based wireless LAN devices, for
fuzzing 802.11 MAC. Also, Weinmann [67] used OpenBTS (open base transceiver
station), which is a software-based GSM access point.
In [67], Weinmann demonstrated how memory corruption vulnerabilities in the
GSM baseband firmware can be found and exploited. These security problems
were serious: practical exploitation of these completely compromised the integrity
of the attacked commercial handset.
Approaches using protocol source codes is an experimentally successful ap-
proach for stateful fuzzing. However, these approaches cannot be used generally
for a fuzzing attack due to the lack of availability of the source code.
5.2.4 My Fuzzing Tools
My fuzzing tools consist of
• Anite protocol conformance tester: The Anite protocol conformance tester
allows control over the MAC protocol. Therefore, I am able to make fuzzing
cases based on testing and test control notation version 3 (TTCN-3) test
case scripts running on the Anite tester. I can generate a message with ar-
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bitrary payload, though I cannot modify the header and cyclic redundancy
check (CRC). The entire Anite equipment set consists of the base station
protocol conformance tester with Astro 8140-e mobile station emulator and
the mobile station protocol conformance tester with Astro 8140-e base sta-
tion emulator; however, I had access only to the mobile station protocol
conformance tester with Astro 8140-e base station emulator. Therefore, I
used the Anite protocol conformance tester for stateful MAC fuzzing on
mobile station. Specifically, this provides me with coverage. I describe my
approach using the Anite tester in detail in Section 5.4.1.
• Agilent protocol conformance tester: Since I had access to the mobile sta-
tion protocol conformance tester with Astro 8140-e base station emulator,
the Anite protocol conformance tester allowed only fuzzing of the mobile
station. Therefore, I examined the feasibility of using an Agilent base sta-
tion protocol conformance tester to perform base station fuzzing. I secured
an equipment loan for a limited time, and during that time, I developed one
simple test case script for fuzzing. I describe my approach using the Agilent
tester in detail in Section 5.4.2
• Software radio: I examined the use of software radio as a hardware platform
for fuzzing. I believe that it is feasible to build a basic engine that allows
for stateless fuzzing of some functions. The software radio approach allows
me to extend both the coverage and complexity of my engine, because I can
simultaneously overlap messages (though my initial engine implementation
may not include this functionality). I describe my software radio approach
in more detail in Section 5.4.3.
• Automation tools: In order to ensure the speed of my fuzzing engine, as
shown in Section 5.4.4, I have evaluated the Anite protocol conformance
tester’s “campaign” feature, which allows me to automate several tests to-
gether.
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Because the complexity of a fuzzing environment is constrained by the envi-
ronment in which the system is tested, the fuzzing engine itself cannot provide
much complexity ; rather, complexity reflects the environment in which the fuzzing
engine is run. For example, in an environment with multiple base stations (and
therefore handoff) and multiple normal mobile stations, fuzzing may have more
interesting effects than when isolated with a single base station or with a single
mobile station.
5.2.5 Consequent Design Considerations
For RF generation, I used three pieces of RF-generating equipment: the Anite
protocol conformance tester, an Agilent protocol conformance tester, and a Na-
tional Instruments software radio. The Anite protocol conformance tester is only
able to connect to mobile stations, but comes with software that understands
and responds to MAC layer messages, enabling communications that reflect the
session state relevant to a specific communication. Furthermore, the Anite pro-
tocol conformance tester includes a test suite for tests that provide substantial
coverage of WiMAX message types and complex scenarios that a mobile station
may encounter. Similarly, the Agilent protocol conformance tester is only able to
connect to base stations, and also comes equipped with software similar to the
Anite protocol conformance tester.
The software radio can connect to mobile stations and base stations, but is
only programmable at the waveform level. As a result, a software radio has great
flexibility, since it can perform fuzzing at a variety of layers (though I primarily
consider the MAC layer here). However, the software is also limited, because the
software radio does not natively understand any component of the WiMAX pro-
tocol: the physical-layer modulation, MAC-layer access rules, MAC-layer packet
formats, and MAC-layer session state must each be programmed into the soft-
ware radio from scratch. Thus, though the software radio can in theory perform
any of the tests that the Anite and Agilent protocol conformance testers can, the
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Figure 5.2: MAC packet format.
productivity of work done on a software radio is inherently much lower.
Because of the limitations of these respective platforms, I build a mobile station
fuzzing engine based on the Anite protocol conformance tester, and a base station
fuzzing proof of concept on the Agilent protocol conformance tester and software
radio platform. I focus the bulk of my efforts on the Anite protocol conformance
tester, because the platform is much more aligned with the level at which I would
like to test the system.
My development efforts focused largely on sending packets with valid CRCs in
the header. Each packet contains a 32-bit CRC to allow the receiver to reject
packets that arrive with bit errors. Because implementations usually check the
CRC before further packet processing, sending messages with incorrect CRC val-
ues provides very little coverage, since only the data paths prior to the CRC is
tested.
Because the RF environment is inherently random, certain tests may fail simply
because of randomly caused packet losses. In simple environments with only
a single mobile station and base station, I believe that direct wire connections
provide more repeatable results.
5.3 Overview of WiMAX MAC Packet Format
Before describing my work in detail, I describe the format of WiMAX MAC
protocol messages. A WiMAX MAC protocol packet consists of header, payload,
and CRC, as shown in Figure 5.2. The payload in WiMAX MAC message consists
of type-length-value (TLV) tuples as the example, RNG-RSP (ranging response)
message in Figure 5.3.
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Figure 5.3: RNG-RSP message payload.
The type field in the TLV tuple is one byte, and the meaning of each value of
that field is specified in the IEEE 802.16 standard [1]. If the actual length of the
value field is less than or equal to 127 bytes, then
• The length of the length field should be one byte,
• The most significant byte (MSB) of the length field should be set to zero,
and
• The other seven bits of the length field should be used to indicate the actual
length of the value field in bytes.
If the length of the value field is more than 127 bytes, then
• The length of the length field should be one byte more than what is actually
used to indicate the length of the value field in bytes,
• The MSB of the first byte of the length field should be set to one,
• The other seven bits of the first byte of the length field should be used to
indicate the number of additional bytes of the length field (i.e. excluding
the first byte), and
• The remaining bytes (i.e. excluding the first byte) of the length field will be
used to indicate the actual length of the value field.
There are three types of TLV tuples:
• Fixed length: Length of value field is fixed as the example in Figure 5.4.
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Figure 5.4: Bandwidth allocation support TLV.
Figure 5.5: Visited NSP realm TLV.
• Variable length: Length of value field is variable as shown in Figure 5.5.
• Nested: Some TLVs can be nested, taking on formats such as: TL(TLV,
TLV, TLV), TL(TL(TLV)).
5.4 Evaluation
In this section, I describe my assessment of the work. Specifically, I address four
aspects of testing and my assessment methodologies:
• Stateful fuzzing of the mobile station
• Stateful fuzzing of the base station
• Stateless fuzzing of the mobile station and base station
• Automating the fuzzing process
5.4.1 Stateful Fuzzing of the Mobile Station
Anite Protocol Conformance Tester
I have examined the Anite protocol tester and determined that the current Anite
equipment consists of base station emulator and mobile station protocol confor-
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Figure 5.6: Protocol stack in a mobile station protocol conformance tester.
mance tester. As a result, my efforts focus on fuzzing the MAC protocol on a
mobile station, and in my design, the Anite tester is used only for mobile station
testing.
The architecture of the mobile station protocol conformance tester is shown in
Figure 5.6. Test scripts are written in TTCN-3. TTCN-3 is an internationally
standardized testing language and is specifically designed for black box testing
and certification. TTCN-3 specifies a test, which is executed in a test system as
shown in Figure 5.7. The TTCN-3 runtime interface (TRI) and TTCN-3 control
interface (TCI) standards define the test system architecture.
Each TTCN-3 test case script is a combination of external function calls speci-
fied in ETSI TS 102 545-3 [72], which are implemented in the TRI, and macMsg.send(),
which generates packets in TTCN-3 test cases. The protocol conformance test
software, on the PC, runs the test scripts and communicates with the tester
through an Ethernet interface.
During the early stages of the research I searched for a way to modify the
packet sent by the protocol conformance tester in order to generate a fuzzed
packet. I analyzed macMsg.send()to determine whether I could use that to send
arbitrary packets. As described in Section 5.3, a WiMAX MAC packet consists
of header, payload, and cyclic CRC. Using macMsg.send(), I can send a message
with an arbitrary payload. Even though I cannot modify the header and CRC (i.e.
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Figure 5.7: TTCN-3 test systems.
88
header and CRC are automatically added), I can modify the payload for fuzzing.
Furthermore, as I describe previously, modifying the CRC is usually of limited
usefulness because packets with incorrect CRCs are rejected early in processing
through a single code path.
As mentioned previously, best practices indicate a limited number of fuzz oper-
ators can provide strong coverage of typical implementation errors [64]. Table 5.1
shows a list of fuzz operators that I contemplated for use with the length field of
each message type. I examined all 255 TTCN-3 test case scripts of the mobile
station conformance test suite to determine the ability of that script to gener-
ate fuzzed packets through modification of type-length-value components using
the fuzz operators in Table 5.1. Appendix B shows the results of this evaluation.
For example, I modified test case ‘TP/SS/MAC/FRAG/BV-H008’ and succeeded
in sending a modified ‘RNG-RSP’. I found 38 scripts that could be fuzzed with
all fuzz operators in Table 5.1. The other test cases are incompatible with such
fuzzing, for reasons such as
• Unavailability in the Anite tester. Despite being in the European Telecom-
munications Standards Institute (ETSI) standard, some test cases are not
supported in the Anite tester.
• Certain test cases require a special environment such as handover.
• Certain test cases require special testing functions in the mobile station.
Usually, a mobile station has some hidden functions that support protocol
conformance test cases. However, I am unable to access those functions with
the commercial client firmware.
• Some test cases do not send any messages. These test cases only ensure that
the mobile station sends the required messages to the base station.
Through the above evaluation, I found that I can modify the message types
shown in Table 5.2. Based on the Anite mobile station protocol conformance
tester and TTCN-3 test case scripts, I develop entire test sets to explore TLV fields
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Table 5.1: Fuzz operators.
Fuzz operator Fixed length field Variable length field
Not present N/A O
Overflow N/A O
All bits zero O O
MIN−1 O O
MIN O O
MAX O O
MAX+1 O O
All bits one O O
using the fuzz operators in Table 5.1 and nested TLVs. Because of the substantial
complexity of parsing and processing these message types, I expect that this ap-
proach is the most important and provides the most meaningful tests. Specifically,
previous fuzzing research on other protocols, described in Section 5.2.3, showed
that typical weaknesses against fuzzing come from memory corruption during the
decoding of malformed protocol messages. Using test scripts in the mobile station
protocol conformance tester, I am able to make fuzzing scenarios based on this
understanding of the protocol and typical software and firmware errors. These
approaches also lay the groundwork for my fuzzing engine’s ability to introduce
other types of fuzz operators.
Controlling the Fuzz Operator
In order to accommodate several fuzz operators in a single test script, I can modify
the test script for each operator, but that requires compiling each change, which
is not efficient for testing. Instead, I added the fuzz operator as a parameter con-
trolled by protocol implementation extra information for testing (PIXIT), which
can be changed in run-time.
Here is the method of adding the fuzz operator in PIXIT.
1. Add PXT FUZZ OPERATOR in config 1B 23510.cfg, as shown in Figure 5.8.
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Table 5.2: MAC management messages (extracted from Table 38 in IEEE
standard 802.16 [1]).
Type Message name Message description
5 RNG-RSP Ranging response
7 REG-RSP Registration response
11 DSA-REQ Dynamic service addition request
13 DSA-ACK Dynamic service addition acknowledge
14 DSC-REQ Dynamic service change request
16 DSC-ACK Dynamic service change acknowledge
17 DSD-REQ Dynamic service deletion request
27 SBC-RSP SS basic capability response
29 DREG-CMD De/reregister command
36 REP-REQ Channel measurement report request
2. In a file of TTCN-3 test scipts, WMx Pixits 16e.ttcn, I define
PXT FUZZ OPERATOR as follows:
modulepar { UInt8 PXT FUZZ OPERATOR := 0}
3. Use PXT FUZZ OPERATOR as variable in test scripts and compile test
scripts.
4. Change the value of PXT FUZZ OPERATOR at run-time in ‘Configure’
→ ‘Pixit Configuration’ in Anite protocol conformance tester program, as
shown in Figure 5.9.
Best Practices
My stateful fuzzing idea is to attack TLV tuples. Table 5.1 represents the fuzz
operators that are applied to fixed length TLV and variable length TLV. The
operator “Not present” omits a value filed from a TLV tuple. The “Overflow”
operator produces multiple occurrences of the same value field in the frame. The
operators “All bits zero” and “All bits one” are self-explanatory. The “MIN” and
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Figure 5.8: Add PXT FUZZ OPERATOR.
Figure 5.9: PIXIT param configuration manager.
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“MAX” operators produce the minimum and maximum values that a field might
contain, as specified by IEEE 806.16e, the WiMAX specification. The purpose
of adopting fuzz operators is for increasing the speed of the fuzzing engine. This
method is more efficient than scanning the set of all possible values, yet provides
similar coverage of the codepaths.
As shown in Table 5.3, I modified 10 test cases for fuzzing 10 messages with
fuzzing operators (“All bits zero”, “MIN−1”, “MIN”, “MAX”, “MAX+1”, “All
bits one”) in fixed/variable length TLV.
In case of variable length TLV, there are two more fuzz operators: not present
and overflow.
• Not present: does not work when fuzzing with protocol conformance tester.
For example, in test case ‘TP/SS/RLC/PRNG/TI-H001’, when I eliminate
the value of ‘old new SLPID’ TLV in RNG-RSP message, tester does not
send RNG-RSP message. The reason may be low MAC in Anite protocol
conformance tester checks the message.
• Overflow: implemented in chosen test cases (shown in Table 5.3). These are
effective. I found a case of client crash presented in Section 5.4.1, and also
found that some test cases can crash even tester.
It is believed that nested TLVs could potentially have vulnerabilities. Because
TLV-decoding implementations may use recursion, it is possible that a multi-
level deep TLV will cause the receiving implementation to overflow the stack,
or encounter other problems, before the implementation finishes resolving the
recursive calls needed to decode the message.
However, a multi-level deep TLV, such as TL(TL(. . .)), is not available in
WiMAX. In WiMAX, there is specific rule for nested TLVs. The types that
are nested TLVs are limited, and the types that can be contained within any
given nested TLV are also limited. For example, for variables of nested type A,
only types B and C can be included.
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Table 5.3: Test cases used for fuzzing.
Test	  Case	  Name 5 (RNG-RSP) 7 (REG-RSP) 11 (DSA-REQ) 13 (DSA-ACK) 14 (DSC-REQ) 16 (DSC-ACK) 17 (DSD-REQ) 27 (SBC-RSP) 29 (DREG-CMD) 36 (REP-REQ)
TP/SS/CSOC/CDS/BV-­‐H000 1 1 1 1 1
TP/SS/PHS/BV-­‐H000x	   1 1 1 1 1
TP/SS/MAC/BV-­‐H006	   1 1
TP/SS/MAC/FRAG/BV-­‐H008	   1
TP/SS/MAC/FRAG/BV-­‐H009	   1 1 1 1 1
TP/SS/MAC/CRC/BV-­‐H001	   1
TP/SS/MAC/CRC/BV-­‐H002	   1
TP/SS/INI/REG/BV-­‐H001	   1 1
TP/SS/INI/REG/TI-­‐H001	   1 1
TP/SS/RLC/IRNG/BV-­‐H019	   1 1
TP/SS/RLC/PRNG/BV-­‐H045	   1 1 1 1 1 1
TP/SS/RLC/PRNG/TI-­‐H001	   1 1 1 1 1 1
TP/SS/RLC/SBC/BV-­‐H000a	   1
TP/SS/RLC/SBC/BV-­‐H001a	   1 1
TP/SS/RLC/FBK/BV-­‐H006	   1 1 1 1 1 1
TP/SS/RLC/FBK/BV-­‐H007	   1 1 1 1 1 1
TP/SS/RLC/FBK/BV-­‐H008	   1 1 1 1 1 1
TP/SS/RLC/FBK/BV-­‐H011 1 1 1 1 1 1
TP/SS/RLC/FBK/BV-­‐H012	   1 1 1 1 1 1
TP/SS/RLC/FBK/BV-­‐H014	   1 1 1 1 1 1 1
TP/SS/RLC/FBK/BV-­‐H015	   1 1 1 1 1 1 1
TP/SS/DS/DSA/BV-­‐H000	   1 1 1 1 1 1 1
TP/SS/DS/DSA/BV-­‐H001	   1 1 1 1 1
TP/SS/DS/DSA/BV-­‐H007	   1 1 1 1 1 1
TP/SS/DS/DSA/TI-­‐H003	   1 1 1 1 1
TP/SS/DS/DSC/BV-­‐H010	   1 1 1 1 1 1 1
TP/SS/DS/DSC/BV-­‐H011	   1 1 1 1 1 1 1
TP/SS/DS/DSC/BV-­‐H013	   1
TP/SS/DS/DSC/BV-­‐H020 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
TP/SS/DS/DSD/BV-­‐H000	   1 1 1 1 1 1 1
TP/SS/DS/DSD/BV-­‐H001	   1 1 1 1 1 1 1
TP/SS/DS/DSD/TI-­‐H004	   1 1 1 1 1 1 1
TP/SS/DS/QPS/BV-­‐H001	   1 1 1 1 1 1 1
TP/MS/IDM/TIDM/BV-­‐H000	   1
TP/MS/IDM/TIDM/BV-­‐H001	   1
TP/SS/CDM/MFS/RLV/BV-­‐H000	   1 1 1
TP/SS/CDM/MAP/BV-­‐H008	   1 1 1
TP/SS/CDM/MAP/BV-­‐H009	   1 1 1
Marked colors in test cases represent:
• Green: fuzzing values (all bits zero, MIN−1, MIN, MAX, MAX+1, all bits
one) in fixed/variable length field
• Yellow: not present in variable-length field
• Blue: overflow in variable-length field
• Red: the example of tester crash by overflow in variable-length field
• Orange: nested tuples
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A possible fuzzing scenario is the overflow variable filed in nested TLV. It is not
different from fuzzing using variable length TLV. Another idea is the overflow of
TLV tuples. These are also implemented in chosen test cases (listed in Table 5.3)
Crashing Example: Exploit the SBC-RSP (SS Basic Capability
Response) Message
Using the methodology described above, I fuzzed the “SBC-RSP” (SS basic capa-
bility response) message using the Anite tester; the result of this test was a crash in
the mobile station. Specifically, I modified the test case ‘TP/SS/MAC/CRC/BV-
H002’. In the last part of “SBC-RSP” message, I added “b6 81” and filled 98
bytes with “61” as shown in Figure 5.10. The meaning of the added bit stream is
as follows:
• “b6”: Type from the TLV tuple. It means ‘visited NSP realm’ as shown in
Figure 5.5.
• “81 61”: Length from the TLV tuple. The MSB of “81” is one. Therefore,
as described in Section 5.3, the other seven bits indicate the number of
additional bytes of the length field. However, hex “61” is 97, which is less
than 127; as a result, this representation of length violates the specification
described in Section 5.3.
• 97 bytes of “61”: Value from the TLV tuple.
To add this bit stream in the last part of the “SBC-RSP” message, in the
TTCN-3 test scripts, I found the function that handles the “SBC-RSP” message.
Figure 5.11 shows the function call control flow in the test script. After the
TLV is generated in f createSbcRspTLVs(), I added the commands to add the
malformed bit stream.
Finally, I succeeded in sending this malformed “SBC-RSP” from the Anite
tester (acting as a base station) to mobile station. Whenever I run this test and
send this malformed packet to the mobile station (Seowon Intech SWU-3400AN
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Figure 5.10: Malformed SBC-RSP message.
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Figure 5.11: TP/SS/MAC/CRC/BV-H002.
running on Microsoft Windows XP), the mobile station hardware is no longer
visible to the host operating system. I believe this to be an implementation-
dependent problem because I have not noticed this problem when I test with
another mobile station (Alvarion RG230).
5.4.2 Stateful MAC Fuzzing on Base Station
Since I only had access to the mobile station protocol conformance tester in the
Astro 8140-e base station emulator, that equipment configuration is likely to allow
only fuzzing of the mobile station. Therefore, I examined the feasibility of using an
Agilent base station protocol conformance tester to perform base station fuzzing.
Due to the limited time for which I had the equipment, I examined one simple
test case script ‘TP/BS/INI/REG/BI/H000’ for fuzzing.
I connected the Anite equipment (taking on the role of a base station emulator,
the left side of Figure 5.12) to the Agilent base station protocol conformance tester
(the right side of Figure 5.12).
I used the same approach as I did with the Anite tester because test scripts
comply with standards set by ETSI. As shown in Figure 5.13, I succeeded in
generating the malformed REG-REQ message. Through this evaluation, I confirm
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Figure 5.12: Agilent tester.
that stateful fuzzing using a protocol conformance tester is possible on the base
station as well as the mobile station. I also confirm that my fuzzing engine is
extensible to base station fuzzing, and that the same approaches are valid.
5.4.3 Stateless MAC Fuzzing on Mobile Station and Base Station
One possible approach for stateless MAC fuzzing is to use software radio. I
explored the National Instrument (NI) software radio platform, the Microsoft
SORA software radio platform, and the Rice university WARP software radio.
Each of these software radios have arbitrary waveform generation capability, which
correlates well with usage in a random-packet environment.
I evaluated the use of software radio, specifically focusing on the NI signal
analyzer and signal generators. To evaluate this method, I first recorded the
transmission from a mobile station. In my feasibility evaluation, I replay the
recorded transmission back to the base station (as represented by the Anite tester).
A more complete fuzzer would include the ability to interpose between a base
station and a mobile station, and to replace a packet with a packet generated
from scratch. Because the software radio does not have a built-in MAC protocol
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Figure 5.13: Malformed REG-REQ message sent by Agilent base station
protocol conformance tester.
implementation, achieving the same capability with a software radio as with the
protocol conformance tester would require a subsidiary implementation effort, and
a full implementation of such is beyond the scope of this chapter.
My progress is as follows:
• To analyze the RF signal, I first tried to detect the communication between
the Anite tester (the role of base station) and the mobile station in the NI
RF analyzer & generator. I can recognize transmission from Anite tester,
however, I cannot detect wireless transmissions from the mobile station even
though the RF analyzer & generator is located within 1m of the mobile
station.
• I scanned for the RF signal as emitted by the Anite tester and the mobile
station, using the software radio in a spectrum analyzer mode. However,
due to low signal strength, I was unable to receive the signal. I verified that
the tester was receiving RF signals by also scanning for Wi-Fi and GSM
signals from cellular phones.
• I thought the output power of mobile station might be too low for the RF
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Figure 5.14: Test serial.
analyzer to detect. Therefore, I connected the Anite tester and the mobile
station to RF analyzer & generator by wire. I can recognize very low power
RF signal from the mobile station.
• I decided to use RF amplifier between the mobile station and RF analyzer
& generator. With amplifier, I could record the transmission from a mobile
station.
• I replayed the recorded signal (RNG-REQ (ranging request) messages) to
the base station, with the NI signal analyzer and signal generators playing
the role of a mobile station. Through serial messages from the Anite tester
as shown in Figure 5.14, I recognized that base station received the replayed
messages and sent the responses (RNG-REP).
A software radio approach has limitations; even though software radio allows
extensive stack fuzzing and can even manipulate the waveform seen by the phys-
ical layer, the radio software does not natively understand any protocol message.
Thus, I can easily replay a message, and I can also modify the bits of a mes-
sage, but cannot react to protocol state. This is the advantage of stateful fuzzing
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described in Section 5.4.1 and Section 5.4.2.
5.4.4 Automation
To automate the mobile station fuzzing, I can use the entire Anite environment
(consisting of the protocol conformance test program, packet viewer, etc.). I have
confirmed that the protocol conformance test program includes an automation
feature, called a “campaign”. A test campaign is an ordered sequence of test
cases that can be run using a single run command. I have used the campaign
feature to automate certain protocol conformance tests.
In spite of automation, monitoring is required during testing, since in some
cases, the driver hangs during fuzzed operation, and the next tests are not pro-
ceeded. (In such cases, it is possible to use an automation tool on the client to
periodically reset the hardware driver, though I did not develop such functional-
ity.)
5.5 Summary
I developed my fuzzing engine as follows:
• Anite/Agilent protocol conformance tester: I evaluated the use of the proto-
col conformance testers as described in Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2. I recognized
that Agilent protocol conformance tester is useful for stateful MAC fuzzing
of a mobile station, as shown by the example attack in Section 5.4.1. Using
38 TTCN-3 test scripts that I identified as being fuzzable, I made complete
fuzzing scenarios with each fuzz operator in Table 5.1 and fuzzing ideas
described in Section 5.4.1. Also, with one simple test case script, I con-
firmed Agilent’s base station protocol conformance tester was available for
performing base station stateful fuzzing using the same techniques.
• Software radio for base station fuzzing: I evaluated the use of a software
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radio for base station fuzzing, and in particular stateless fuzzing, as described
in Section 5.4.3.
• Automation: I demonstrated the feasibility of automation tool, “campaign”
in the Anite tester described in Section 5.4.4. The fuzzing engine compo-
nents that use the Anite tester are provided as a couple of campaigns.
Even though the protocol conformance tester can be used for fuzzing, I found
that the protocol conformance tester sometimes crashed during the fuzzing test.
The low MAC implementation in the protocol conformance tester (in Figure 5.6)
might crash while handling incorrect traffic generated by TTCN-3 test cases. Also,
the number of test cases that I can use for fuzzing is limited because many test
cases are just a combination of external function calls which are implemented in
the TRI in Figure 5.7.
Fuzzing is a suitable method to discover these security flaws in wireless MAC
protocol implementations. The protocol conformance tester can more easily gen-
erate incorrect traffic for fuzzing a MAC protocol rather than other methods.
Therefore, standardization organizations might pay attention to removing the de-
scribed barriers of fuzzing with the protocol conformance tester.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
This dissertation has investigated the threats against the wireless medium access
control (MAC) protocol. I have presented four case studies as the examples of
being uncooperative, denial-of-service (DoS), sniffing/man-in-the-middle (MITM),
and fuzzing.
First, as the example of being uncooperative, in Section 2, I have analyzed the
effect of carrier sense misbehavior in IEEE 802.11 networks. To understand the
effect of carrier sense misbehavior in a broader set of network parameters, I have
developed an analytical model based on Bianchi’s model and quantified the effect
through simulation. Also, I have considered both selfish and adversarial attackers.
My results have shown that carrier sense misbehavior does reward the attacker.
I have identified which set of network parameters reward the attacker.
Second, as the example of DoS, I have presented a new DoS attack against
802.11 wireless networks in Section 3. My attack exploits the previously discov-
ered performance degradation in networks with substantial rate diversity. In my
attack, the attacker artificially reduces his link quality by not acknowledging re-
ceptions, thereby exploiting the retransmission and rate adaptation mechanisms
to reduce MAC-layer performance. I have shown that time-based regulation at
the data queue of the access point can similarly mitigate the negative impact of a
partial deafness attacker. I have explored two means for implementing time-based
regulation, and show interesting interactions between those mechanisms and the
transport control protocol (TCP).
Third, as the example of sniffing/MITM, in Section 4, I have presented a scheme
that establishes a secure wireless connection between a client device and an access
103
point in hotspots that typically are not secured at the MAC layer because they
are open to the public. In my approach, I have used hierarchical identity-based
cryptography, and each user uses its MAC address as its public key.
Finally, as the example of fuzzing, in Section 5, I have introduced my evaluation
results using fuzzing based on the WiMAX protocol conformance testers and a
software radio. I have created fuzzing cases based on TTCN-3 test case scripts
that are distributed with standards and running on commercial WiMAX protocol
conformance testers. Though my platforms had some restrictions, my evaluation
has shown that a protocol conformance tester is a useful tool for fuzzing MAC pro-
tocol implementations. Also, I have suggested approaches that would overcome
such restrictions, and the potential for introducing fuzzing into the standardiza-
tion processes, which is of particular interest to standards organizations.
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APPENDIX A
TIME DISTRIBUTION OF
BEACON-INDUCED BACKOFF
Each access point periodically broadcasts beacons. Since beacons are broadcast
messages, they are not acknowledged, so the 802.11 standard considers all bea-
con transmissions successful. However, when beacons are transmitted between
retransmissions, the perceived success from the broadcast causes the access point
to choose a contention window on the interval between [0,CWmin]. Furthermore,
since the packet waiting for retransmission has not yet been acknowledged, the
access point does not reset the retry limit counter. This creates significant dis-
crepancies in the backoff process between what the standard specifies and what
actually happens using commercial products.
To demonstrate the discrepancies caused by the periodic beacons, I examine
the latency between the sixth and seventh transmissions. The 802.11 standard
specifies that the seventh transmission wait short interframe space (SIFS) (10 µs)
and then back off with a value uniformly distributed over [0, CW[7]]. However, if
the contention window were reset between the mth and the (m+1)st transmissions,
the resulting backoff between the sixth and seventh transmissions would be off by
a factor of 2m−1. (I use m− 1 instead of m because CW[6] = CW[7] in 802.11b).
Therefore, given that the beacons are transmitted periodically, I should expect
the latency to be distributed geometrically.
A.1 Broadcom Chipset
I examined a Linksys WRT54G (ver. 5) using a Broadcom chipset. By default,
this access point sends a beacon message every 100 ms. However, as shown in
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Figure A.1: Latency between the second to last and last retransmissions of the
same packet. 106
Section 3.3, the total time required to send seven transmissions almost always
takes longer than 100 ms. Thus, I change the beacon interval to 200 ms in order
to demonstrate the effect of the beacon messages.
Figure A.1(a) shows a histogram of the latency between the sixth and seventh
packet transmissions with each bin size 100 µs, equaling five slot times. I catego-
rized transmissions into two sets: one set contains all the transmissions where a
beacon packet had been interleaved between the first transmission of this packet
and the seventh; the other set contains all the transmissions for which no bea-
con packet had been interleaved between the first transmission of this packet and
the seventh. The thin line shows the latency of the second set: that is, when
no beacon has been interleaved. In the non-interleaved case, the latency is uni-
formly distributed, as would be expected from reading the 802.11 standard. The
bold line shows my observation of latency from the first set: that is, for packets
into which beacons have been interleaved. In this case, the latency is exponen-
tially/geometrically distributed, which shows that beacons are interleaved and
this interleaving does affect the backoff values chosen.
A.2 MadWifi Driver
As described in Section 3.4.1, the hardware abstraction layer (HAL) module op-
erates between the hardware and the device driver and is implemented to manage
many of the chip-specific operations. The HAL module is distributed with the
driver. Thus, the same Atheros network interface card (NIC) may exhibit different
behaviors when using different drivers that contain different HALs.
With the same scenario as described in Section A.1, I tested the MadWifi
driver and the Atheros NIC by using HostAP. I observed that the MadWifi driver
does not increase its contention window when retransmitting packets as shown in
Figure A.1(b). There had been suspicions that MadWifi driver is not backing off
properly [73]; moreover, when I used Windows and a Windows driver with the
same Atheros NIC in an ad-hoc connection, I did not observe the improper backoff
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behavior. I thus conclude that MadWifi driver does not perform exponential
backoff properly.
A.3 Marvell ARM914 Chipset
I also tested the Linksys WRT54GC access point, which uses the Marvell ARM914
chipset. I found that the maximum number of retransmissions was four instead
of seven. The 802.11 standard specifies that packets with payload longer than
the request-to-send (RTS) threshold are transmitted up to the long retry count
of four, and with payloads shorter than the RTS threshold, they are transmitted
up to the short retry count of seven. Most access points, including the Linksys
WRT54GC, set the RTS threshold so that all packets are sent without RTS/clear-
to-send (CTS), and thus each packet should be retransmitted up to seven times.
I thus conclude that the WRT54GC improperly set the short retry count to four.
A.4 Intel 2200BG Chipset
Using the same scenario as described in Section A.1, I tested the Intel 2200BG
network interface card by making ad-hoc connections in Linux. The results are
shown in Figure A.1(c). Like the Broadcom 802.11 chipset, the Intel chipset
sends out periodic beacons, which results in anomalous backoff distribution when
interleaved with retransmissions.
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APPENDIX B
TEST CASES’ USEFULNESS FOR FUZZING
Table B.1 shows test cases’ usefulness for fuzzing. The number in the ‘Usefulness’
column represents message type in Table 5.2.
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Table B.1: Test cases’ usefulness for fuzzing.
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Table B.1: Continued.
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</.=C0.P5@=.P007L51?.9042<-.![).2-.=C0.E%'B.5-7.=/5-@H2=@.O.L2=@.356J0.
2-.=C0./0@0/307.P5@=*A007L51?.1C5--06F.
5,7,11,13,27,29
!"#$$#9[%#P(_#()*+,,R.
%C01?.=C5=`.VC0-.=C0.($.@0-7@.5.%;D%+.566<15=2<-.D:.K2=C`.
*.A007L51?.=M>0X,L,,.W>CM@2156Ya.
*./0></=.=M>0X,LS.Wc<-0Ya.
*.d<-0."0/HJ=5=2<-X,L,,,.W"E$%.K2=C.566.@JL1C5--06@Ya.
*.d<-0.!M>0X,L,S.W$!%.c<-0Ya
*.%DT9.c<-0.H05@J/0H0-=.=M>0X,L,.W>26<=@Ya.
*.N5\</.Q/<J>.D-7215=</X,.WJ@0.5-M.@JL1C5--06.2-.=C0."E$%.c<-0YF.
!C0.DE!.701<70@.=C0.A5@=*A007L51?.1C5--06.D:.WEDE%X,Y.2-.=C0.E[*N8".
</.=C0.P5@=P007L51?.9042<-.![).2-.=C0.E%'B.5-7.=/5-@H2=@.=C0.1<//01=.O.
L2=.356J0.2-.=C0./0@0/307.P5@=*A007L51?.1C5--06F
5,7,11,13,27,29
!"#$$#9[%#P(_#()*+,SS
VC0-.=C0.($.@0-7@.5.%;D%+.566<15=2<-.D:.K2=C`
*.A007L51?.=M>0X,L,S.W0AA01=230Ya...
*./0></=.=M>0X,LS.Wc<-0Ya
*.%DT9.c<-0.H05@J/0H0-=.=M>0X,L,.W>26<=@YF
!C0.DE!.701<70@.=C0.A5@=*A007L51?.1C5--06.D:.WEDE%X,Y.2-.=C0.E[*N8".
</.=C0.P5@=P007L51?.9042<-.![).2-.=C0.E%'B.5-7.=/5-@H2=@.=C0.1<//01=.O.
L2=.356J0.2-.=C0./0@0/307.P5@=*A007L51?.1C5--06F
5,7,11,13,27,29
!"#$$#9[%#P(_#()*+,SZ.
VC0-.=C0.($.@0-7@.5.%;D%+.566<15=2<-.D:.K2=C`.
*.A007L51?.=M>0X,L,,.W>CM@2156Ya.
*./0></=.=M>0X,LS.Wc<-0Ya.
*.d<-0."0/HJ=5=2<-X,L,,,.W"E$%.K2=C.566.@JL1C5--06@Ya.
*.d<-0.!M>0X,L,S.W$!%.c<-0Ya
*.%DT9.c<-0.H05@J/0H0-=.=M>0X,L,.W>26<=@Ya.
*.N5\</.Q/<J>.D-7215=</X,.WJ@0.5-M.@JL1C5--06.2-.=C0."E$%.c<-0Ya.
*.NDN&e>0/HJ=5=2<-eA007L51?e1M160X,L,SB.,LS,B.</.,LSSF.
!C0.DE!.701<70@.=C0.A5@=*A007L51?.1C5--06.D:.WEDE%X,Y.2-.=C0.E[*N8".
</.=C0.P5@=P007L51?.9042<-.![).2-.=C0.E%'B.5-7.=/5-@H2=@.=C0.1<//01=.O.
L2=.356J0.2-.=C0./0@0/307.P5@=*A007L51?.1C5--06F
5,7,11,13,27,29
:;+<7&9A:
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Table B.1: Continued.
!"#$$#9[%#P(_#()*+,S]. VC0-.=C0.($.@0-7@.5.9:"*9:;.=C0.DE!./0@><-7@.K2=C.5.9:"*9$".F 5,7,11,13,27,29,36
!"#$$#9[%#P(_#()*+,S^.
VC0-.=C0.($.@0-7@.5.9:"*9:;.K2=C.![).SF].5@?2-4.A</.=C0.H05-."%DT9.
A</.=C0.A2/@=."E$%.c<-0.K2=C.$%X,.WL2=@f,*ZXg,,,gB.L2=fSRXg,gYB.=C0.DE!.
/0@><-7@.K2=C.5.9:"*9$".K2=C.![).ZFO.<A.60-4=C.S.LM=0F
5,7,11,13,27,29,36
!"#$$#'$#'$8#()*+,,,.
P</.051C.J>62-?.4/5-=.@1C07J62-4.=M>0.W0F4F.(:B.0=1Y.=C0.DE!.@J>></=@B.<-.
/010232-4.5.'$8*9:;.1<-=52-2-4.566.-010@@5/M.$0/3210.P6<K."5/5H0=0/@.
5-7.%<-30/40-10.$JL.65M0/."5/5H0=0/@.5-7.+N8%#%N8%.!J>60.J-60@@.
-04<=25=2<-.<A.5J=C</2c5=2<-.><621M./0@J6=07.2-.g-<.5J=C</2c5=2<-g.=<.
0@=5L62@C.5-.E[.@0/3210.A6<KB.=C0.DE!.=/5-@H2=@.5.35627.'$8*9$".K2=C.5.
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5,7,11,13,17,27,29
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&-.0G>2/M.<A.!S,B.=C0.DE!.@0-7@.-<.H0@@540.5-7.0-7@.=C0.'$'.
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Table B.1: Continued.
!"#N$#D'N#!D'N#()*+,,,.
!C0.DE!.@0-7@.'9:Q*9:;.K2=C.5.'0*9042@=/5=2<-e90IJ0@=e%<70X,G,Z.
5-7.K2=C.5.%N8%.!J>60.![).J-60@@.-04<=25=2<-.<A.5J=C</2c5=2<-.><621M.
/0@J6=07.2-.g-<.5J=C</2c5=2<-gF
29
!"#N$#D'N#!D'N#()*+,,S.
!C0.DE!.@0-7@.'9:Q*9:;.K2=C.5.'0*9042@=/5=2<-e90IJ0@=e%<70X,G,S.
5-7.D760.N<70.90=52-.D-A</H5=2<-.![).5=.9:;*7J/5=2<-.0G>2/5=2<-F
29
!"#$$#%'N#NP$#9[)#()*+,,,.
&-./010232-4.E[*N8"@.K2=C.H2-2HJH.N8"./06035-10.W866<15=2<-.$=5/=.
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"'E@.>0/.=C0.E[.4/5-=F
7, 27, 29
!"#$$#%'N#N8"#()*+,,R.
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A2067.6<-40/.=C5-.0G>01=07B.=C0.DE!.@C566.>/<10@@.2-A</H5=2<-.J>.=<.=C0.
?-<K-.60-4=CF.!C0.DE!.@C566.1<-=2-J0.=<.701<70.-0G=.N8"eD:F
7, 27, 29
!"#$$#%'N#N8"#()*+,,U.
VC0-.DE!./010230@.5.E[*N8".K2=C.0G=0-707*Z.D:.WEDE%XSSY.A</.KC21C.
=C0.DE!.C5@.-<.?-<K60740.2=.24-</0@.=C0.0-=/MF
7, 27, 29
+/>
=/>
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